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Abstract 
Schouten, M.A.H., N.B.P. Polman & E.J.G.M. Westerhof (2013). Exploring green agricultural policy scenarios with a spatially 
explicit agent-based model. Wageningen, Statutory Research Tasks Unit for Nature & the Environment (WOT Natuur & Milieu), 
WOt-werkdocument 323. 82 p. 13 Figs.; 11 Tabs.; 65 Refs.; 4 Annexes.  
 
This report presents an analysis of the impact of environmental cooperative decision-making for the European Commission’s 
legislative proposals for the EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 2014-2020. The analysis is based on scenarios with a 
spatially explicit rural agent-based model (SERA) that explicitly models farmers, their socio-economic decision-making, their 
land use, and the landscape of which they are part. The first part of the analysis focuses on the effects of environmental 
cooperative collective decision-making for implementation of the ‘greening measure’ Ecological Focus Areas (EFAs). The 
second part of the analysis focuses on the interest of collective agri-environment measures. Results show that ways through 
which EFAs are allocated are crucial for effectiveness of cooperative approaches. Relying on simple market oriented 
governance structures will not by definition result in a better allocation of EFAs in a region. Results show that when the 
environmental cooperative is a key player in the designation and allocation of Pillar II agri-environment schemes, farmland 
biodiversity potentially increases because local expert knowledge on favorable ecological sites can be used for optimal 
allocation of the schemes. 
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Summary 
This working document presents an analysis of the spatial, ecological and economic impact of 
farmers’ cooperative decision-making for the European Commission’s legislative proposals for the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 2014-2020 on farmers, their land use and their surroundings. The 
analysis is based on scenarios with a spatially explicit rural agent-based model (SERA) that explicitly 
models farmers, their socio-economic decision-making, their land use, and the landscape of which 
they are part.  
 
The analysis is split into two parts. The first part of the analysis focuses on the effects of 
environmental cooperative decision-making for implementation of the ‘greening measure’ Ecological 
Focus Areas (EFAs), in which farmers are obliged to convert 7% of their agricultural land for 
biodiversity purposes. Two alternative management regimes are simulated, the first one assuming 
that farmers oblige to the measure by converting 7% of their own land into Ecological Focus Area. 
The second one assuming that the environmental cooperative facilitates exchange between farmers 
within the region, through arranging transferable obligations between farmers. The second part of 
the analysis addresses agri-environmental measures within the second pillar of the CAP. Two 
alternative management regimes were simulated, the first considering agri-environmental contracting 
as it is now, with a fixed payment per hectare, irrespective of parcel characteristics. The second one 
assumes an important role for the environmental cooperative that uses their local knowledge to 
decide which parcels are contracted with agri-environment schemes given budget constraints and 
given their contribution to biodiversity.  
 
In order to get a good overview of the spatial, ecological and economic impact of both measures and 
both management regimes, results were analyzed using indicators with respect to biodiversity, 
operational farm profit and the number of operating farms in both regions. Results of 
experimentation with the model in the case study Oost-Groningen (arable farming) and the case study 
Winterswijk (dairy farming) show that the conversion of high productive land into EFAs leads to a 
significant decrease in operational profit, as productive land is taken out of production on farm level 
and regional level. Farms will choose their less productive land to be EFAs. These EFAs will be 
scattered around the area. Furthermore, it is shown that when exchange of EFA parcels is allowed 
between farmers in the areas, based on economic value of land only, lower biodiversity is developed 
in the model than when comparing to a situation in which farmers have to comply to the EFAs 
measure on their own farm. Less productive land that is not sufficiently located in neighborhood of 
the farmstead will be under EFAs. This means that coordination of environmental cooperatives cannot 
rely on simple spot market based mechanisms. Therefore more procedures will be necessary.  
 
When the environmental cooperative is a key player in the designation and allocation of Pillar II agri-
environment schemes, farmland biodiversity potentially increases because local expert knowledge on 
favorable ecological sites can be used for optimal allocation of the schemes. In line with the 
attributes of the transactions for EFAs and agri-environment schemes it follows that hybrid 
governance arrangements would be appropriate for environmental cooperatives. Hybrid 
arrangements consist of elements both of markets and hierarchies. However, other means of co-
ordination are used besides prices and hierarchy, such as reciprocity and trust. Implementing these 
means will require further model development.  
 
We conclude that this approach is novel and holds promise as a way to explore the impact of 
environmental cooperative decision making on rural areas. The modeling approach used in this study 
integrates both the natural environment and the socio-economic component at a detailed level. In this 
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way insight is gained into the complex dynamics of rural areas while imposing different types of 
policy instruments with different types of management regimes to the system. These insights can be 
valuable for rural policy makers and managers to evaluate what the impact is of potential policies, 
and to gain insight into the impact of environmental cooperatives, while aiming at creating 
sustainable development 
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Samenvatting 
Verkenning van vergroeningsmaatregelen in de landbouw; toepassing van 
een ruimtelijk expliciete agent-gebaseerde benadering 
 
In leiding 
Collectieven van boeren kunnen mogelijk bijdragen aan vergroening van het Gemeenschappelijk 
Landbouwbeleid (GLB), zowel in de eerste pijler (met name de ecologische aandachtsgebieden) als 
de tweede pijler (agrarisch natuur- en landschapsbeheer). De analyse is gebaseerd op experimenten 
met verschillende scenario’s door middel van een ruimtelijk expliciet ruraal agent-gebaseerd model 
(SERA). Deze nieuwe agent-gebaseerde methode levert inzichten op over de complexiteit van 
besluitvorming van agrarische ondernemers, de invloed hiervan op het omringende landschap en hoe 
dit kan worden gestuurd door beleid. Dit kan toegevoegde waarde bieden voor beleidsmakers en 
gebiedscoördinatoren doordat een globaal inzicht wordt verkregen in potentiële effecten van nieuwe 
beleidsmaatregelen gericht op biodiversiteit. Om preciezere inzichten te verkrijgen is verdere 
modelontwikkeling nodig. Het onderzoek laat zien dat collectieve vormen van agrarisch natuurbeheer 
kunnen bijdragen aan ecologische netwerken op landschapsniveau. De wijze waarop agrarische 
natuurverenigingen agrarisch natuurbeheer onderling afstemmen in een gebied is hierbij bepalend 
voor de bijdrage aan biodiversiteit. 
 
Aanleiding 
Op 12 oktober 2011 heeft de Europese Commissie wetgevingsvoorstellen gedaan voor het nieuwe 
Gemeenschappelijk Landbouwbeleid dat op 1 januari 2014 ingaat, en loopt tot en met 2020. Op dit 
moment zijn de onderhandelingen tussen de Europese Commissie (EC), het Europees Parlement en 
de Landbouw- en Visserijraad (Ministers) over specifieke invulling van dit nieuwe beleid in volle gang. 
Een belangrijk element in de voorstellen van de Europese Commissie is het vergroenen van de 
directe betalingen aan boeren via een verplicht aantal maatregelen. Voor Nederland heeft de 
maatregel ecologische aandachtsgebieden (‘Ecological Focus Areas’, EFA) een mogelijk grote 
impact. In deze maatregel worden boeren verplicht om een deel van hun areaal in te richten voor 
‘ecologische doeleinden’.  
 
Op dit moment is er een debat gaande in Nederland tussen de overheid en betrokken partijen over 
hoe deze maatregel ingevuld zou moeten worden. Hoewel nog niet duidelijk is hoe precies de 
implementatie van de maatregel er uit zal zien, is het wel duidelijk dat de EC voor ogen heeft dat de 
EFA-maatregel netto meer niet- of minder-productief oppervlak in het agrarisch gebied oplevert, wat 
een duidelijke meerwaarde oplevert voor klimaat, milieu en/of biodiversiteit. De Nederlandse overheid 
ondersteunt deze prioritering, en zet daarnaast in op het werken met collectieven om de effectiviteit 
van agrarisch natuurbeheer te vergroten. De verwachting is dat een collectieve aanpak zal leiden tot 
een meer samenhangende aanpak van agro-milieubeheer en schaalvoordelen voor individuele 
ondernemers. Zij kunnen op basis van een regionale visie, zelfsturing en een eigen plan van aanpak 
een pakket aan maatregelen samenstellen. Dit pakket berust dan op een op het gebied toegesneden 
plan dat samenhang heeft en past bij de regionale bedrijfsvoering. Binnen een viertal GLB-
pilotsstudies is men momenteel aan het experimenteren met gebiedsgericht werken via collectieven 
van boeren.  
 
Het WOt-project ‘Verkenning van vergroeningsmaatregelen met een ruimtelijk expliciete agent-
gebaseerde benadering’ heeft de potentiële effecten verkend van inzet van collectieven bij de 
uitvoering van de 1e pijler-maatregel ecologische aandachtsgebieden en 2e pijler-maatregelen voor 
agrarisch natuur en landschapsbeheer (specifiek gericht op SNL; Subsidiestelsel Natuur en 
Landschapsbeheer. De regio’s Oost-Groningen (overwegend akkerbouw) en Winterswijk 
(grondgebonden melkveehouderij) worden gebruikt als case study gebieden.  
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Methode 
Het ruimtelijk expliciete ruraal agent-gebaseerde model ‘SERA’ is toegepast om de potentiële 
effecten van collectief en individuele uitvoering van beide maatregelen in kaart te brengen. SERA is 
een model om besluitvorming te bestuderen in een ruraal landschap dat wordt gevormd door boeren, 
hun bedrijven, en het omringende landschap. Agent-gebaseerde modellen zijn op dit moment een 
populaire methode om complex gedrag van mensen (‘agenten’), natuur en omgeving te bestuderen, 
omdat dit kan worden gedaan in een experimentele setting waarbij de belangrijkste elementen van de 
werkelijkheid kunnen worden gevat in een model. Ook voor beleidsevaluaties voor nieuw 
landbouwbeleid is deze methode in het verleden toegepast. SERA onderscheidt zich van andere 
agent-gebaseerde benaderingen doordat individuele besluitvorming van boeren, wordt gecombineerd 
met landgebruik, gewasproductie en biofysische processen (grondwater, bodemgeschiktheid). SERA 
wordt gevormd door de individuele boeren (agenten), hun percelen en het omringende landschap in 
Oost-Groningen en Winterswijk.  
 
Figuur 1 geeft een overzicht van de verschillende modules in SERA die iedere boer ieder jaar 
doorloopt. Het model simuleert een periode van 15 jaar. Voor het model wordt Landbouwtellingdata 
gebruikt van de individuele boeren in Oost-Groningen en Winterswijk. Er zijn 564 akkerbouwers in 
Oost-Groningen en 201 melkveehouders in Winterswijk geselecteerd voor het referentiejaar 2010. 
Samen gebruiken deze boeren ongeveer 60% van de landbouwgronden in beide gebieden. Verder 
wordt data gebruikt over landgebruik, gewasgroei, bodemkwaliteit, bodemgeschiktheid en 
grondwater door middel van GIS-kaarten.  
 
De akkerbouwsector in Oost-Groningen in SERA produceert zetmeelaardappelen, suikerbieten en 
tarwe in een bouwplan. Daarnaast kunnen zij contracten voor agrarisch natuurbeheer afsluiten en 
kunnen de gevolgen van EFAs worden gesimuleerd. De opbrengst van deze gewassen is afhankelijk 
van lokale variaties in bodemkwaliteit. Iedere periode maakt de boer keuzes over landgebruik op zijn 
percelen, en over het eventueel kopen of verkopen van percelen. 
 
De melkveehouderijsector in Winterswijk wordt weergegeven in SERA door melkveehouders. Naast 
de mogelijkheid voor uitvoering van agrarisch natuurbeheer en EFA’s produceren melkveehouders 
melk, gras en snijmaïs. De boeren verschillen van elkaar in termen van bedrijfsgrootte, aantal koeien, 
aantal hectares gras en maïs, bodemkwaliteit van de percelen, locatie van het bedrijf in het gebied, 
leeftijd en aanwezigheid van een opvolger.  
 
In het model reageert een boer op veranderingen in de omgeving en veranderingen in zijn eigen 
situatie (bijvoorbeeld door pensionering, bedrijfsopvolging) door het management van zijn bedrijf aan 
te passen. De boeren zijn in staat om land uit te wisselen op een landmarkt, percelen te contracteren 
met agrarische natuurbeheerscontracten, of land uit productie te nemen voor de EFA-maatregel. 
Ieder jaar maakt de boer keuzes op basis van zijn veranderde situatie, of zijn veranderde omgeving.  
 
Voor het model zijn de onderstaande punten van belang: 
• Het model start met een initialisatiestap waarbij de basisdata wordt ingelezen. 
• In de bedrijfsmodule beschikt iedere boer over een besluitvormingsmodel waarmee de virtuele 
boer beslissingen neemt, maar die ook interne variabelen meeneemt, zoals leeftijd en de 
aanwezigheid van een opvolger. Op basis van deze besluitvormingsmodellen reageert de boer in 
het model op veranderingen in zijn eigen situatie en in zijn omgeving. Het doel van de boeren in 
SERA is om zoveel mogelijk winst te behalen, gegeven de informatie die de boer heeft. 
• In de SNL-module maken boeren de keuze of zij percelen willen contracteren met agrarische 
natuurbeheerscontracten (SNL = Subsidiestelsel Natuur en Landschapsbeheer). 
• In de landmarktmodule kunnen boeren percelen uitwisselen met elkaar. 
• In de EFA-module kiezen boeren welk deel van hun bedrijf uit productie wordt genomen voor de 
7% EFA regeling.  
• In de resultatenmodule worden alle veranderingen in de bedrijfsstructuur en in het landschap 
geregistreerd. Deze veranderingen dienen als input voor de volgende simulatieronde van een jaar. 
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• Voor de bijdrage aan het ecologisch netwerk wordt voor ieder perceel een index berekend. 
Hierdoor is in één oogopslag duidelijk hoe groot de (potentiële) bijdrage is van een perceel aan 
het ecologische netwerk. 
 
In Figuur 1 wordt SERA schematisch weergegeven. Deze gegeven worden gebruikt bij de start van 
het model (initialisatie in Figuur 1). 
 
 
Figuur 1: Stroomdiagram met stappen die boer in SERA doorloopt  
 
 
Scenario’s en resultaten 
Tabel 1 geeft een overzicht van de scenario’s die met behulp van SERA zijn gesimuleerd.  
 
Tabel 1: Overzicht gesimuleerde scenario’s 
Scenario Naam Uitvoering in SERA 
0 Basis scenario 
 
Geen beleidsimplementaties 
• Geen agrarisch natuurbeheerscontracten 
• Geen EFA’s 
• Boeren verhandelen grond 
1 Huidig Europese Commissie voorstel 
 
7% EFA voor iedere boer verplicht op zijn 
eigen bedrijf 
• Boeren verplicht om 7% van hun land om te 
zetten voor ecologische doeleinden op hun 
eigen bedrijf 
• Ieder perceel is potentieel geschikt 
2 Collectieve implementatie van 7% EFA’s 
 
Collectief faciliteert uitruil van 
vergroeningsrechten tussen boeren 
• Boeren verplicht om 7% van hun land om te 
zetten voor ecologische doeleinden. Ze mogen 
dit uitruilen met andere boeren.  
• Het collectief regelt de uitruil van 
‘vergroeningsrechten’ tussen boeren in het 
gebied 
• De uitruil is economisch gedreven, geen criteria 
gesteld voor biodiversiteit  
3 Agrarisch natuurbeheerscontracten volgens 
huidige SNL beleid 
Agrarisch natuurbeheer in door de overheid 
aangewezen gebieden 
• Een vaste betaling per hectare, ongeacht 
bijdrage van perceel aan ecologisch netwerk 
• De provincie wijst gebieden aan  
4 Implementatie van agrarisch 
natuurbeheerscontracten door collectief 
 
Het collectief bepaalt waar percelen worden 
gecontracteerd, op basis van lokale kennis 
van het gebied 
• Het collectief bepaalt op basis van bijdrage aan 
ecologisch netwerk welke percelen worden 
gecontracteerd, met inachtneming van het 
beschikbare budget 
• Er is een flexibele betaling per hectare, op basis 
van bijdrage van perceel aan ecologisch netwerk 
en bonus 
• Het totale budget is niet beperkend. 
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De boeren in SERA kunnen voldoen aan de verplichtingen voor de EFA-maatregel door 7% van hun 
areaal in te richten voor ecologische doeleinden. Dit doen ze in eerste instantie op het eigen bedrijf; 
in tweede instantie is er een optie om ‘vergroeningsplichten’ uit te ruilen met andere boeren in het 
gebied. Deze uitruil wordt gefaciliteerd door het collectief. Boeren die vergroeningsplichten uitruilen, 
betalen een vergoeding aan de boer die de plicht aantrekt. De hoogte van de vergoeding wordt 
bepaald door vraag en aanbod.  
 
Agrarische natuurbeheerscontracten kunnen worden afgesloten op percelen of akkerranden die zijn 
gekenmerkt als zoekgebied in de provinciale natuurbeheerplankaart. In eerste instantie bepaalt de 
overheid waar percelen worden afgesloten, tegen een vaste vergoeding per hectare. In tweede 
instantie bepaalt – in de modellering – het collectief waar percelen worden afgesloten, op basis van 
de toegevoegde waarde van het perceel voor ontwikkeling van biodiversiteit. De boeren krijgen een 
vergoeding die afhangt van deze toegevoegde waarde, op basis van de Reilly index. Het totale 
budget is onbeperkt. In Oost-Groningen kunnen natuurbeheerscontracten alleen worden afgesloten 
op akkerranden, die binnen het zoekgebied liggen voor ‘bouwland met doortrekkende en 
overwinterende akkervogels’. De hoogte van de vergoeding verschilt voor klei- en zandgrond. In 
Winterswijk kunnen potentiële contracten alleen worden afgesloten op percelen die liggen binnen het 
zoekgebied voor ‘botanisch weiland/ botanisch hooiland’. Voor deze contracten geldt een verbod op 
toedienen van dierlijke mest, gebruik van kunstmest, gebruik van bestrijdingsmiddelen en deze 
percelen kunnen slechts beperkt worden begraasd.    
 
EFA-maatregel 
De resultaten laten zien dat de invoering van de EFA-maatregel in beide case studies zorgt voor een 
lager inkomen per hectare op bedrijfsniveau, door het uit productie halen van agrarisch land. Als 
uitruil van vergroeningsrechten wordt toegestaan tussen boeren in het gebied, dan leidt dit tot een 
iets lagere natuurwaarde dan wanneer iedere boer verplicht wordt om de maatregel op het eigen 
bedrijf te voldoen. Belangrijkste reden hiervoor is te vinden in de aannames in SERA, die veronder-
stellen dat boeren de laagproductieve percelen (en niet per definitie die met de hoogste natuur-
waarde) zullen gebruiken om aan de eis te voldoen. Deze percelen zijn wijder verspreid in het gebied, 
en liggen niet per definitie in de buurt van natuurgebieden. Het aantal actieve bedrijven wordt in beide 
case studie gebieden sterk beïnvloed door demografische factoren als vergrijzing en de 
beschikbaarheid van een opvolger. Deze factoren zorgen voor een sterke daling in het aantal actieve 
bedrijven over een simulatieperiode van 15 jaar. Deze demografische factoren blijken een sterkere 
invloed te hebben op het aantal actieve boeren gedurende de simulatieperiode dan de twee 
beleidsmaatregelen.  
 
Agrarisch natuurbeheerscontracten 
De invoering van agrarische natuurbeheerscontracten zorgt in beide gebieden voor een hoger 
bedrijfsinkomen dan in een situatie waarin géén agrarisch natuurbeheer wordt uitgevoerd. 
Belangrijkste reden hiervoor is dat boeren in SERA hun laagproductieve percelen of akkerranden 
kunnen contracteren voor agrarisch natuurbeheer (SNL), en hierdoor een hogere opbrengst per 
perceel kunnen behalen dan in het geval van conventionele productie. De bijdrage aan biodiversiteit 
vertoont een sterke stijging wanneer het collectief leidend is bij het aanwijzen en contracteren van 
percelen voor agrarisch natuurbeheer.  
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Policy background 
On 12 October 2011 the European Commission (EC) presented a set of legislative proposals for the 
EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 2014-2020 period. The proposals are designed to make the 
CAP ‘a more effective policy for a more competitive and sustainable agriculture and vibrant rural 
areas’ (EC, 2011a; p.5). The main five proposals consist of draft regulations on rules for direct 
payments; on a single Common Market Organisation (CMO); on support for rural development; on 
financing, management and monitoring (horizontal rules); and on the Common Strategic Framework 
(CSF) (see EC, 2011a; EC, 2011b; EC, 2011c; EC, 2011d; EC, 2011e). 
 
In the EC proposals, the present two-pillar structure of the CAP is to be maintained, though they will 
be modified (Westhoek et al., 2012). The main instruments of Pillar I are direct payments to farmers 
and market measures. The most prominent change is the introduction of a greening component to 
Pillar I, giving three measures at farm level: 
• Crop diversification; 
• Maintenance of permanent grassland;  
• 7% Ecological Focus Areas (EFAs) on all eligible land per farm – except permanent grassland and 
farms with less than three hectares of arable land used for the preservation of ecological 
reserves and landscapes. This condition may be met by setting aside arable land, left to lie fallow, 
or by using buffer strips, landscape features, afforested areas and terraces – if part of the 
eligible area of the farm.  
 
Main aim of the proposed greening measures is to stimulate farmland biodiversity and reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions. The greening measures in Pillar I have an annual, non-contractual basis 
and apply to all EU farmers in a generic way. For The Netherlands, the 7% EFA measure will have the 
largest impact (see Van Doorn et al., 2012 and TK, 2012) on agricultural production, land use and 
spatial configuration when comparing to the other two. There is an on-going debate in The 
Netherlands on how to implement EFAs in the most effective and efficient way. Westhoek et al. 
(2012) states that the proposed greening measures will only be effective if they are tailored to 
region-specific management conditions, giving maximum freedom for optimal implementation at a 
local level, through i.e. farmers’ collectives.  
 
Within Pillar II, proposed changes aim at multi-annual, location specific contracts that are targeted to 
specific priorities. Six new EU-wide priorities for Pillar II are proposed (EC, 2011b). Restoring, 
preserving and enhancing ecosystems that depend on agriculture and forestry, is one of these 
priorities. The special character of each territory should be taken into account and agri-environmental 
initiatives at national, regional and local level should be encouraged. These proposed changes show 
a clear reference to the use of farmers’ collectives to increase efficiency and effective rural 
development. The EC proposal for rural development states that ‘support for collective approaches 
to environmental projects and practices should help to provide greater and more consistent 
environmental and climate benefits than can be delivered by individual operators acting without 
reference to others (for example, through practices applied on larger unbroken areas of land). 
Support in these various areas should be provided in various forms’ (EC, 2011b, p.19).   
 
Currently, the Dutch government evaluates the potential of applying more collective instead of 
individual agreements concerning agri-environment schemes (AESs). The basic logic is that agri-
environment programs are not applied on isolated parcels, but are integrated into the regional 
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farming system. Both the provinces and the central government encourage such a regional 
approach, where environmental cooperatives receive a budget linked to a given biodiversity target, 
which they may organize in their own way within the existing governmental regulations. The Ministry 
of Economic Affairs states that one wants to examine the possibility to increase the role of 
environmental cooperatives for executing CAP measures (TK, 2011). The execution of CAP measures 
is expected to be more effective and efficient when using environmental cooperatives. The concept 
of collective agreements is applicable to both Pillar I measures (especially the EFAs) and Pillar II 
measures (mainly AESs).  
 
For this study, a first analysis is made of the potential impact of using environmental cooperatives for 
the EFAs proposed in Pillar I and AESs in Pillar II. A spatially explicit rural agent-based model (SERA) is 
used to experiment with different implementation scenarios for the 7% EFA measures. Furthermore, 
the model assists in evaluating the possibilities for applying collective instead of individual 
agreements concerning AESs.  
 
 
1.2 Objective 
The objective of this study is to provide insight into the spatial, ecological and economic impact of 
applying collective approaches for both Pillar I greening measures and Pillar II agri-environment 
measures through experimentation with different scenarios using a spatially explicit agent-based 
model. The first part of the analysis focuses on the EFAs greening measure. The second part of the 
analysis focuses on the interest in collective AESs.  
 
 
1.3 Overview of the working document 
This working document proceeds as follows. In Chapter 2 an overview is given of the European 
Agricultural Policy post 2013. Chapter 3 discusses the agent-based method used in this study. 
Chapter 4 discusses the two case studies. In Chapter 5 the scenarios used for model simulation are 
discussed as well as the way we implemented the EU proposals in SERA. Chapter 6 discusses the 
results. The working report concludes with a conclusion and discussion in Chapter 7.  
 
Table 1.1: Overview of the working document 
Chapter Content 
Chapter 1: Introduction Policy background and research objective 
Chapter 2: European Common Agricultural Policy post 
2013: State of the Art 
Extensive policy background 
Chapter 3: Methodology Why using an agent-based modelling approach? 
Chapter 4: Case studies from Oost-Groningen and 
Winterswijk 
Case studies 
Chapter 5: Scenarios  Modeling scenarios for Ecological Focus Areas and 
agri-environment schemes in SERA: Discussion of 
model scenarios  
Chapter 6: Results Main results 
Chapter 7: Reflection  
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2 European Common Agricultural Policy post 2013: State 
of the Art 
2.1 Pillar I: Ecological Focus Areas 
2.1.1 Initial legislative proposals of the European Commission 
In the legal proposals for the CAP after 2013 (EC, 12 October 2011), its present two-pillar structure 
is to be maintained: Pillar I for market measures as well as direct payments, and Pillar II covering 
rural development. According to the proposals, both Pillars will be modified. These modifications 
have several objectives, including increasing the contribution of the CAP to a more sustainable 
management of natural resources and climate actions (Westhoek et al., 2012). The direct payments 
in Pillar I are mainly aiming at providing ‘basic annual income support to EU farmers’ (EC, 2011a). 
Proposed changes to the CAP concern a reform of cross-compliance requirements and a new design 
for direct payments. The most prominent change is the introduction of a greening component to 
Pillar I, with three measures at farm level: 
• Crop diversification by growing at least three different crops, each covering an area of between 
5% and 70% per farm holding. The legislative proposal does not promote crop rotation or a 
specific combination of crops, as the latter could be perceived as production support and hence 
distort trade. 
• Maintaining permanent grassland. This applies to grassland that has not been reseeded for at 
least five years. Individual farmers are obliged to preserve at least 95% of this reference area. 
• 7% EFAs on all eligible arable land per farm – except permanent grassland and farms with less 
than three hectares of arable land. This condition may be met by setting aside arable land, left to 
lie fallow or by using buffer strips, landscape features, afforested areas and terraces – if part of 
the eligible area of the farm. The conditions for payment are annual and non-contractual, 
therefore EFAs are not fixed in space or time.  
 
Organic farms do not have to comply with these conditions to be eligible for payment. Agricultural 
areas that have been designated as nature areas under the Bird and Habitats Directives have to 
comply, unless the measures interferes with Natura 2000 targets.  
 
In the legislative proposals, EFAs are defined as (EC, 2011a): 
Article 32: Ecological focus area 
1. Farmers shall ensure that at least 7 % of their eligible hectares as defined in Article 25(2), 
excluding areas under permanent grassland, is ecological focus area such as land left fallow, 
terraces, landscape features, buffer strips and afforested areas as referred to in article 
25(2)(b)(ii). 
2. The Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 55 to 
further define the types of ecological focus areas referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article and to 
add and define other types of ecological focus areas that can be taken into account for the 
respect of the percentage referred to in that paragraph. 
 
It can be concluded that EFAs can be described as parts of the eligible hectares that are not used for 
conventional agricultural production, but are used for ecological purposes (Van Doorn et al., 2012).  
 
EFA measure is still under development 
The legislative proposals of the Commission are still described in general terms and the 
implementation of EFAs is still subject to European and national debates. The proposals state that 
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only area currently used for agricultural production can be designated for EFAs. During a debate in 
November 2011, Commissioner Ciolos proposed to add existing landscape elements (e.g. field 
margins, hedges, trees, fallow land, landscape features, biotopes, buffer strips and afforested areas) 
to the eligible area that can be designated as EFA. In May 2012 the debate was taken one step 
further, as a concept paper on Greening was presented (EC, 2012) in which the EC states that also 
AESs should be fulfilling for the EFA greening measure. From a Dutch standpoint, the former Dutch 
State Secretary Bleker stated that not only arable land should be fulfilling for EFAs, but also 
grassland (see Van Doorn et al., 2012). These debates show that the ‘rules of the game’ for EFAs 
are maturing, still there is a lot of unclarity about the management conditions.  
 
Though, for this study we have to make assumptions with respect to the EFA management conditions 
and there is a high probability that the actual decisions made by policy makers with respect to the 
EFA measure will be different. Still, this study can be a valuable contribution to the on-going process 
as it provides insights into different ways of implementing EFAs.  
 
Despite of the fact that the EFA measure is still under development, the main idea behind the 
measure is that more eligible hectares should be taken out of production, and used for ecological 
purposes. In Chapter 5 it is described how we deal with these ambiguities using several 
assumptions. 
 
2.1.2  Foreseen impacts of EFAs 
Effects on farming practices 
According to the EC Impact Assessment (EC, 2011f) an ecological set-aside requirement of 7% 
would lead to a set-aside of between 2.3% and 4.6% in actual practice. This percentage is lower than 
the requirement, as currently fallow land is already considered ecological set-aside. In The 
Netherlands, approximately 0.5% of agricultural land eligible for direct payments, is suitable for the 
EFA measure. Less than 3% of the area is contracted with AESs. The total area of landscape 
elements is unknown, estimations range from 3.2% to over 10% (Van Doorn et al., 2012). It seems 
most meaningful to implement the measure in these areas where the obtained ecological value could 
be the highest.  
 
Hence, there are certain loopholes, as a farmer with little EFA could rent parcels from farmers in 
other regions with plenty of low-productive areas, or even rent parcels of land from non-farmers 
(Westhoek et al., 2012; Zijlstra et al., 2011). In Chapter 5, we elaborate on how we prevent these 
possible loopholes from occurring by making model assumptions. 
 
Effects on farmland biodiversity  
The actual impact on biodiversity very much depends on the local conditions, details of regulations, 
and practical implementation. Westhoek et al. (2012) states that the introduction of EFAs may result 
in about one per cent more species richness on EU farmland by 2020. This one per cent increase is 
not absolute, but relative to a baseline scenario that does not foresee greening of the CAP 
(adaptation of PBL results from Van Zeijts et al., 2011). Species richness is very much related to 
land-use type and land-use intensity. Changes in land use and intensity are therefore a rough indicator 
of changes in biodiversity in farmland areas. Westhoek et al. (2012) conclude from their study that 
biodiversity could improve substantially if EFAs would be implemented in such a way that they create 
a region-specific natural habitat for species under threat, organized on landscape level through multi-
annual green infrastructure. Relevant boundary conditions concern shape and size of the areas 
(sufficiently large or broad), vegetation type (e.g. herbs or grains without chemicals), duration (multi-
annual) and location. Preferably, EFAs would be connected through a multi-annual green 
infrastructure, yielding associated positive effects on biodiversity through species migration from 
ecological stepping stones and by establishing keystone structures, such as hedgerows and 
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woodlands. This could be reached by combining the Pillar I greening measure and compensating 
additional costs and stimulating regional cooperation with Pillar II. In Section 3.2.3 is explained how 
an indicator for farmland biodiversity is integrated in this study.  
 
 
2.2 Pillar II: Agri-environment schemes and collectives 
2.2.1 Proposed changes European Commission Pillar II 
Within the proposed changes for Pillar II, the EC states that rural development aims at promoting 
competitiveness, the sustainable management of natural resources, and the balanced development 
of rural areas by more specific and targeted measures. Pillar II would remain the support tool for 
community objectives giving the Member States sufficient flexibility to respond to their specificities 
on a multi-annual, programming and contractual basis. Member States is given sufficient flexibility to 
respond to their specificities on a multi-annual, programming and contractual basis (EC, 2011b). For 
AESs, the proposals state that they should continue to play a prominent role in supporting the 
sustainable development of rural areas and in responding to society's increasing demands for 
environmental services. The latest communication (May 2012) of the EC on simplification of the 
proposals (see EC, 2012; p.3) stated that:  
 
‘With a view to simplification and recognizing the environmental contributions farmers may make 
by taking up Pillar II agri-environment climate commitments or in the context of an environmental 
certification scheme, it is proposed: 
• To foresee, under certain conditions, that a beneficiary of a Pillar II agri-environmental climate 
measure can be considered as fulfilling one (or several) of the greening measures; 
• To foresee, under certain conditions, that a farmer, subject to an environmental certification 
scheme, can be considered as fulfilling one or several of the greening measures.  
 
The conditions which the agri-environment commitments or the environmental certification 
scheme would have to comply with concern: 
• Coverage of whole farm (in line with the greening objective that almost all agricultural area is 
subject to greening requirements) 
• Environmental ambition level that goes beyond the ambition level of greening 
• Type of agri-environmental scheme requirement that corresponds to the nature of the 
greening measures (e.g. crop rotation requirements corresponding to the greening 
requirement of crop diversification). 
 
These adjustments could bring simplification to those farmers who already generate significant 
benefits for the environment and the climate. It would also encourage other farmers to join the 
schemes and programs in question thus increasing overall environmental and climate benefit of 
the CAP. 
 
Apparently, the discussion after adoption of the proposals on greening and simplification resulted in 
extension of the greening measure EFA. It can be concluded that parcels under AESs  also contribute 
to the 7% EFA greening component. 
 
With respect to the use of environmental cooperatives, the proposals state that commitments 
undertaken jointly by a group of farmers (environmental cooperative) multiply the environmental and 
climate benefit and therefore should be promoted. However, joint action brings additional transaction 
costs which should be compensated adequately.  
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2.2.2 A collective approach to farmland conservation: the Dutch 
example 
As stated in the introduction, in The Netherlands a decentralization process from government to 
provinces is going on, especially concerning nature policy. With respect to biodiversity and 
landscape elements on agricultural land, one aims for more responsibility for environmental 
cooperatives. Also within the proposed changes of Pillar II of the CAP, the importance of 
environmental cooperatives is mentioned (EC, 2011b). According to the CAP 2014-2020 website of 
the Ministry of EZ1 ‘farmers’ delivery of public goods play an important role in the continuation of the 
CAP towards 2020. A collective approach will be conductive to a coherent agri-environment 
approach and will benefit the delivery of public goods. The effect of the agri-environment schemes 
will benefit the approach to climate change, renewable energy, water management and biodiversity in 
the rural area and is expected to lead to greater participation in agri-environment schemes’.  
 
Within the Netherlands there are about 1502 environmental cooperatives. Around 25%3 of the 
agricultural land is covered by these cooperatives. Their organizational form and activities are 
gradually changing from organizations focusing on the administrative process concerning AESs 
towards organizations who manage on-farm nature and landscape objectives within a region. Instead 
of simply implementing measures, one more and more develops and manages measures in a region-
specific way, given the overall objectives outlined by the national authorities.  
 
According to Jongeneel et al. (2008) the hypothesis is that collective agri-environmental contracts 
will lead to more effective and efficient policies when comparing to individual contracts. Slangen & 
Polman (2002) and Jongeneel et al. (2008) define several reasons for justifying the use of 
environmental cooperatives. The four most important are: 
1. Reduction of the  transaction costs because of economies of scale and common expertise in on-
farm nature management. Also transaction costs for the government are lower because 
negotiations have to take place with one central organisation, instead of individual farmers.  
2. Individual farmers need an institutional mechanism to countervail opportunistic behaviour: main 
problem here is that each contracting party worries about being forced to accept 
disadvantageous terms after making an investment, or worries that its investment will be 
devalued by actions of others. The collective body can prevent this by setting rules. 
3. Compartmentalization in on-farm nature and landscape management is reduced, because of the 
regional or landscape scale approach. 
4. Quality is monitored throughout the process, potential land users are screened and mechanisms 
of self-selection occur. 
 
There is a difference between collective contracts which are pre-determined, or so-called ‘take-it-or-
leave-it-contracts, and a collective contract in which parties are able to negotiate on the 
preconditions (negotiable contracts). In the first case, the government settles the contract terms, 
and the land users have no specific input in the formulation of the contract terms. The negotiable 
contract is characterized by negotiation, in which each party can represent their arguments (tailor 
made contracts) (Jongeneel et al., 2008). More information on the type of contracts, and contract 
terms used for this study can be found in Chapter 5. 
 
Currently one is experimenting with self-management by environmental cooperatives in four pilot 
projects. On 14 October 2010 the Minister of Economic Affairs presented four pilot studies in which 
the role and possibilities of environmental cooperatives in delivering public goods (i.e. landscape, 
                                                   
1 www.toekomstglb.nl 
2 Personal communication with Paul Terwan research & consultancy. 
3 According to ‘A collective approach to farmland conservation – the Dutch example’ by Paul Terwan research & consultancy 
for the ENRD Coordination Committee, 14 June 2012. 
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biodiversity) is further explored (TK, 2010). The four pilot areas get the opportunity to show that they 
are able to contribute to biodiversity or landscape objectives on agricultural land in their region, given 
a certain budget. The four environmental cooperatives ‘Water, Land en Dijken’ (province Noord-
Holland), ‘Stichting Waardevol Cultuurlandschap Winterswijk’ (province Gelderland), ‘Noorderlijk Friese 
Wouden’ (province Friesland) and ‘Agrarische Natuurvereniging Oost Groningen’ (province Groningen) 
were assigned to investigate whether environmental cooperatives can be beneficial in the new CAP 
reforms 2014-2020 (TK, 2011).  
 
On 14 June 2012, the four pilot studies presented their views to the ENRD (European Network for 
Rural Development) in Brussels4. The following advantages of a collective approach were presented: 
1. Increased environmental benefits 
a. more effective for species and habitats that go beyond farm level, interlinking of elements and 
fields, reducing negative externalities (e. g. water quality); 
b. improved regional tailoring: apply measures on suitable locations and motivated farms, room 
for local ideas and environmental innovation; 
c. high participation and scheme coverage because of organisation close to farmers;  
d. high flexibility: adjust measures during the season;  
e. professional support to farmers, sharing knowledge, improved skills. 
2. To the farmer: better tailored measures, less paperwork, shared acquisition of specialist 
equipment. 
3. More efficient scheme control, saving budget (using regional knowledge, creating positive social 
norm). 
4. Simplification of execution of policies. According to the pilot studies, the government only has to 
negotiate with the collective, and not with individual farmers. Except from that, also more local 
knowledge is available, through which policies can be fine-tuned. 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
4 see http://www.toekomstglb.nl/upload/files/presentationbrussels14062012.pdf 
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3 Methodology  
In Chapter 2, an overview is given of the proposed changes in the CAP post 2013, and the potential 
of collective agreements in both Pillar I (EFAs) and Pillar II (AESs) is discussed. In this chapter we 
continue with a description of the model SERA5 that will assist in evaluating the potential effects of 
collective instead of individual measures, taking into account the previously discussed policy 
measures: AESs and the 7% EFAs measure. Section 3.1 gives a description of the main elements of 
the SERA model.  
 
3.1 Background Agent Based Model SERA 
For this study we use the model of Schouten et al. (2012) to analyze human decisions in coupled 
human and natural systems, which builds on Happe et al. (2006) and Lobianco & Esposti (2010) and 
extend it with an arable farm module and the possibility for collective measures. We apply the model 
to the case of 7% EFAs within Pillar I, and AESs in Pillar II.  
 
Modeling human decisions in coupled human and natural systems by means of an agent-based 
modeling (ABM) approach has become a popular bottom-up tool that has been extensively employed 
over the past decades to understand system complexity and non-linear behavior (see e.g. Heckbert 
et al., 2010; An, 2012; Rounsevell et al., 2012). Also many studies exist that focus on ABMs to 
investigate land use changes and consequences of land-use policies at landscape level (see e.g. 
Parker et al., 2003; Bakker & Van Doorn, 2009; Le et al., 2010;). With respect to spatial ABMs 
applied to agricultural policy analysis Balmann (1997), Berger (2001), Happe et al. (2009), Lobianco 
& Esposti (2010), Schreinemachers & Berger (2011) and Schouten et al. (2012) focus on the impact 
assessment of agricultural policy support measures that are part of the EU Common Agricultural 
Policy, taking into account both microeconomic farm management theory and modules for simulating 
biophysical dynamics. Advantage of these policy assessment models is that the effects of policy 
changes on different farm types can be shown, taking into account both structural and spatial 
heterogeneity of the farms in a spatial explicit way.  
 
This type of models is gaining importance as tools for managing tomorrow’s agriculture, as they 
allow to study a wide range of price and trade policy options. Traditionally, predicting the behavior of 
individual farmers is typically based on mathematical programming methods. These models usually 
aggregate individual decision-making at the regional or sector level to evaluate policy options. They 
do not capture the interactions between actors (i.e. individual farm households) assuming that there 
are no transactions and information costs. Furthermore, these models do not fully capture the spatial 
dimension of agricultural activities and their effects on surrounding (nature) areas (Berger, 2001). 
ABMs focused on agricultural policy assessment are able to capture these farmers’ interactions, as 
well as the spatial dimension of their activities while being subject to policy interventions. Farmers in 
ABMs are called agents or in our case farm agents.  
 
                                                   
5 The software code of SERA is written in the object-orientated programming language Java using the open-source agent 
based modelling framework Recursive Porous Agent Simulation Toolkit Symphony 2.0 (Repast S 2.0). Repast offers libraries 
designed for the needs of agent based modelers which include scheduling mechanisms, spatial classes, visualizations and 
basic statistic output features. The model is a middle ranged model and in accordance to other ABMs in the field, the 
designed ABM inherits features from the fields of ACE and MAS/LUCC. Namely, the interaction of economic agents in a 
realistic GIS-based landscape. 
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3.2 Farm agents 
For the purpose of SERA, an agent is defined as ‘an entity that acts individually, senses parts of its 
environment and acts upon it’  (Tesfatsion, 2002). In the context of regional agricultural systems, the 
main group of agents we define in the model are the farm agents or in other words farmers.  
 
In the context of SERA, one farm agent corresponds to one farm or agricultural holding. In 
accordance with the above definition, a farm agent is an ‘independently acting entity that decides 
autonomously on its organization and production to pursue a defined goal (e.g. to gain the highest 
profit)’. A farm agent reacts to changes in its environment and its own state by adjusting its farm 
organization through for instance selling or buying land. By ‘own state’ we mean the available factor 
endowments like the total amount of land, land use or the number of cows. Farmers can adjust their 
farm organization for instance by extending their farm through buying land. We will discuss the farm 
agent en environment in the next sections in more detail. 
 
3.2.1 Model overview 
Figure 3.1 summarizes the different modules and course of events per year of the model for this 
study which are run for every farm agent separately.  
 
 
Figure 3.1: Course of events during one simulation period 
 
Figure 3.1 shows that the model consists of an initialization module, a farm module, an agri-
environment module, a land lease market module, a 7% EFAs exchange module and an output 
module. We will discuss the different modules in more detail below.  
 
• For the initialization module, 201 individual dairy farms (case study Winterswijk) and 564 individual 
arable farms (case study Oost-Groningen) are distinguished, each of which are taken from the 
Agricultural Census (reference year 2010). For both areas, these farm types are the main farm 
types in the areas, and together they cover approximately 60% of the main agricultural production 
area in the regions. Both areas are selected because they both participate in the CAP-pilot of the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs (EZ), and because of their different character (arable farming vs. 
dairy farming). Furthermore they are selected because of their importance for agri-environmental 
management (see e.g. Arisz, 2007 for an example of agri-environmental management in Oost-
Groningen and Korevaar et al., 2006 for an example in Winterswijk). One of the advantages of 
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ABMs is that they can accommodate different behavioral model types, and this model 
distinguishes two farm agent’s behavioral models, namely a behavioral model for arable farmers 
(starch potato producers) and dairy farming (specialized dairy farmers). Agricultural Census data 
serves as input for the individual farm characteristics. The attributes on farm level are the farm 
structure, given in age of the farmer, type of farm, size and number of total owned and rented 
parcels. At parcel level, attributes are crops grown, soil quality, crop suitability, information on 
ground water tables and land use which were used to integrate the production characteristics of 
individual parcels in the model. These characteristics are derived from Cadastral GIS-maps. At 
landscape level, attributes are number of farms in the region, spatial land characteristics (nearby 
National Eological Network nature areas), size and distance from the parcel to the agent’s 
farmstead.  
 
• In the farm module each farm agent is equipped with a behavioral model that guides decisions 
and keeps track of the agent’s internal state described by attributes such as age, location and 
size. According to their behavioral models the individual farm agents evolve subject to their 
current state of attributes and to changes in their environment.  
 
• In the agri-environment module farmers make choices on whether to contract parcels for agri-
environment schemes, keep conventional farming, or offer their parcels to other farmers.  
 
• In the land lease market module parcels of land are reallocated by means of an auction which 
matches bids and asks based on creation of the largest buyer/seller surplus (for extensive 
elaboration see Appendix III).  
 
• Then, the results of the land lease market module, the agri-environment module and the farm 
module serve as input for the 7% EFAs exchange module. In the 7% EFAs exchange module farm 
agents either are obliged to assign 7% EFAs on their own land, or there is a possibility to shift 
these obligations between farmers in the area. The environmental cooperative then has a 
facilitating role in shifts of 7% EFAs obligations between farmers.  
 
• Finally the function of the output module is keeping track of the changes in the region with 
respect to farming structure and AESs and to conditioning of the model results for the next 
simulation period. Results on farm level as well as on the regional level are used to update farm 
attributes and regional attributes in the next period. 
 
3.2.2 The regional environment 
The farm agents’ external environment consists of a spatial environment and an economic-policy 
environment in the region. The first build block is space where land is an essential input for most 
kinds of agricultural production activities, be it for crop or fodder production, or as manure disposal 
area. Hence, space is a factor that cannot be neglected where agriculture is concerned. One way of 
considering the spatial environment of a farm in the context of an ABM is to use Geographic 
Information Systems (GIS) as a representation of landscape. GIS provide a way for organising spatial 
data and assigning certain properties to space. A common way to organise space in a GIS is to 
define a grid of cells. A grid categorises land with respect to attributes of the cells (see i.e. Berger, 
2001; Parker, et al., 2003). SERA differs from currently existing models by mapping the exact 
location of farms and their farm parcels within a region.  
 
Furthermore, we introduce spatially explicit mapping between farm production and landscape through 
integrating ecological quality of the parcels using an index for biodiversity. In this manner, the model 
can be used for environmental impact assessments. The basic approach is to incorporate 
environmental impacts within the assigned parcels with agri-environment schemes within the 
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production economic choices farm agents make in SERA. We derive an indicator, namely the spatial 
cohesion Reilly index, to characterise biodiversity in terms of spatial cohesion of the parcel with AESs 
within the regional ecological species habitat network. See Section 3.2.3 for an extensive elaboration 
on this point. 
 
The economic-policy environment represents the second block of a farm agent’s external 
environment. Agricultural (and environmental) policies affect the farm at different instances such as 
prices, CAP payments, and payments for AESs. Also when the environmental cooperative comes into 
force, this is part of the policy environment.   
 
3.2.3 Biodiversity and habitat network 
To assess the ecological impact of parcels with AESs or 7% EFA, we look at the contribution of the 
parcel to the spatial cohesion of habitat networks in the landscape. This assumption is based on the 
idea that natural ecosystems with viable populations of species need a low degree of fragmentation 
(Saunders et al., 1991; Kinnaird et al., 2002; Myers, 2003). Opdam et al. (2003) applied 
metapopulation ecological theory to infer spatial characteristics for configurations of landscape 
elements that can be used in landscape management for sustainable biodiversity. They introduced 
the concept of spatial cohesion of habitat networks in the landscape. The degree of cohesion of the 
habitat network determines whether or not local extinction and recolonization rates are in equilibrium, 
and whether the network allows the population to persist under stochastic demographic processes 
and environmental perturbation (Hanski, 1999). The spatial cohesion concept implies that the number 
of species finding sustainable conditions in the regional landscape increases with the size and 
environmental quality of the network elements and the degree of connectivity in their pattern. These 
characteristics can be used as proxies for the number of species that potentially occurs in a 
landscape (Opdam et al., 2008). For our purpose, we use the change of connectivity brought about 
by adding a piece of land to the conservation network as a proxy for the change in the spatial 
conditions for biodiversity. The simplification of this approach is that we neglect the time required for 
redeveloping the piece of land from a conventional farmers grassland into a conservation grassland. 
This transition normally requires a period of at least 5-10 years. 
 
To be able to assess the potential of a specific landscape pattern to conserve biodiversity we 
introduce a landscape cohesion method based on spatial data. For this study, we assess the parcels 
contracted with AESs on their potential to conserve biodiversity thereby taking into account their 
spatial configuration in the surrounding landscape. Whittingham (2011) demonstrates that at 
landscape scale, the effect of parcels with AESs on farmland biodiversity has been shown to be 
positively related to the extent of nature conservation area and land under AESs in the surrounding 
landscape. Spatial econometric literature provides an appropriate tool for this problem: The Reilly 
index. The Reilly index derives from Newton’s law of gravitation, where gravity is stronger for larger 
‘bodies’ and gravitational strength is inversely related to the distance between ‘bodies’. It was 
originally applied to the study of retail markets (Reilly, 1931), to reflect the attractiveness of different 
retail areas (cities) relating consumers’ travel costs with the size of alternative retail areas. We 
modify the Reilly index to calculate the impact of surrounding nature conservation areas (within the 
area, and within a radius of 20 km around the case study area) on the potential for biodiversity 
conservation by parcels with AESs. Rather than distance to urban centres, we employ distance to 
nature conservation areas. Instead of population, we use the size of the nature conservation areas 
(measured in square meters).  
 
Equation (1) gives the formula for the calculation of the spatial cohesion Reilly-index. The calculation 
of the spatial cohesion Reilly-index starts at the point where the site is located. After that, the size of 
the nature conservation areas (abbreviation NCA) within a certain radius (i.e. 5 km) is determined, as 
well as the size of the AES site. Based on the sum of all the distances of the site to the nature 
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conservation areas located within the chosen radius, and on the size of the nature conservation 
areas and AES sites, the spatial cohesion Reilly-index can be calculated: 
𝑅𝑖 = �𝐴𝑖 + 𝐶𝑗𝑑𝑖𝑗2𝐽𝑗=1  (1) 
where Ri represent the Reilly-index of parcel i, Ai the surface area of parcel i, J the number of 
conservation areas within range, Cj the surface area of the jth nature conservation area, and dij the 
distances from the parcel to the centres of the conservation areas. The index captures, in one 
number, the size of the nature conservation areas in proximity to the AES or 7% EFA site, and the 
distance from the site to the nature conservation areas (Cotteleer, 2008). We calculate the (potential) 
spatial cohesion Reilly-index for each individual parcel with AES or 7% EFAs, Ri,, hereinafter referred 
to as ecopoints. Strong aspects of the spatial cohesion Reilly-index are the combination of distance 
with size, and the fact that nature conservation areas located further away or that are smaller in size 
are weighted less. As such, the spatial cohesion Reilly-index is a measure for the share of land used 
for a certain land-use function in the surroundings of a specific location.  
 
We illustrate the calculation of the spatial cohesion Reilly-index in Table 3.1 and Figure 3.2 for the 
location of two parcels with AESs: A and B at the beginning of the simulation period. The two parcels 
(A and B) are heterogeneous in size and are situated in the proximity of four different nature 
conservation areas (NCAs). The size of the four NCAs is also given. Figure 3.2 shows the two 
parcels, and their location in relation to the four NCAs. The arrows in Figure 3.2 give the distance to 
the four nature conservation areas. The size and distance correspond with Table 3.1.  
 
 
Figure 3.2: Graphically presentation of the spatial cohesion Reilly-index at the beginning of the simulation 
period  
 
From Table 3.1 and Figure 3.2, it is apparent that for parcel B, the spatial cohesion Reilly-index is 
larger than for parcel A, because parcel B is located closer to one of the nature conservation areas 
and has a larger size. Although NCA 2 is not the largest area, the shorter distance from parcel B to 
this area is largely responsible for the larger number of ecopoints for this parcel. From this 
theoretical example, it can be seen that a parcel with AESs located near or in a NCA, have higher 
number of ecopoints than a parcel that is located further away. Also larger parcels result in higher 
number of ecopoints when compared to smaller parcels.  
NCA 1, 
size: 100 ha 
NCA 4, 
size: 90 ha 
NCA 2, 
size: 50 ha 
NCA 3, 
size: 20 ha 
Parcel B, size: 4 ha 
Parcel A, size: 2 ha 
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Parcel D, size: 7 ha 
Parcel C, size: 7 ha 
 
 
 
 
NCA 1, 
size: 100 ha 
NCA 4, 
size: 90 ha 
NCA 2, 
size: 50 ha 
NCA 3, size: 
20 ha 
Parcel A, size: 2 ha 
 
  
Table 3.1: Spatial cohesion Reilly-index for two parcels with agri-environment schemes at the beginning of 
the simulation period given the size of parcels and NCA and the distance to the NCA 
NCA NCA size 
(m2) 
Size parcel 
A (m2) 
Distance to 
parcel A 
(m) 
Size / 
(Distance)2 
Size of 
parcel B 
(m2) 
Distance to 
parcel B 
(m) 
Size / 
(Distance)2 
1 1,000,000 20,000 1,000 1.02 40,000 1,400 0.53061 
2 500,000  2,100 0.11791  400 3.375 
3 200,000  600 0.61111  700 0.4898 
4 900,000  1,200 0.63888  2,000 0.235 
Spatial 
cohesion 
Reilly-
index 
   2.38791   4.6304 
Source: Adapted from Cotteleer (2008: p. 101) and adjusted. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Graphically presentation of the spatial cohesion Reilly-index during the simulation, with two 
parcels contracted with AESs in previous periods  
 
 
In Table 3.2 and Figure 3.3 we again illustrate the calculation of the spatial cohesion Reilly-index for 
two parcels with AESs: A and B during the simulation period, but now we assume that during 
previous periods two other parcels were contracted with AESs (parcel C &D).  
 
From Table 3.2 and Figure 3.3 it is apparent that for parcel B, the number of ecopoints is larger than 
for parcel A, because parcel B has a larger size, is located closer to one of the NCAs, and is closer 
to one of the AES parcels contracted in a previous period.  
 
 
 
Parcel B, size: 4 ha 
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Table 3.2: Spatial cohesion Reilly-index for two parcels with AESs during the simulation period given two 
other parcels contracted with AESs in previous periods 
NCA or 
other 
AES site 
NCA size 
(m2) 
Size 
parcel A 
(m2) 
Distance to 
parcel A 
(m) 
Size / 
(Distance)2 
Size of 
parcel B 
(m2) 
Distance to 
parcel B 
(m) 
Size / 
(Distance)2 
1 1,000,000 20,000 1,000 1.02 40,000 1,400 0.53061 
2 500,000  2,100 0.11791  400 3.375 
3 200,000  600 0.61111  700 0.4898 
4 900,000  1,200 0.63888  2,000 0.235 
C 70,000  2,000 0.0225  200 2.75 
D 70,000  400 0.5625  1,800 0.034 
Spatial 
cohesion 
Reilly-
index 
   2.9756   7.4144 
Source: Adapted from Cotteleer (2008: p.101) and adjusted. 
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4 Case studies from Oost-Groningen and Winterswijk  
This chapter shows how the two case study areas Oost-Groningen and Winterswijk are parameterized 
in the model. Furthermore, this chapter discusses how the 7% EFAs measure and the AESs were 
modelled for the two case studies Oost-Groningen and Winterswijk, including the possibilities for 
environmental cooperatives within Pillar I and Pillar II.   
 
4.1 Arable farming in Oost-Groningen  
4.1.1 Description of the study area 
The first case study is carried out in the agricultural region Oost-Groningen. The area is dominated by 
arable farming (starch potatoes, sugar beets, cereals). The main soil type is sea clay, and sandy soil. 
The northern-most part of Oost Groningen is characterized by sea clay and dike landscapes. The 
eastern part is also characterized by sea clay and dike landscapes, alternating with forested areas, 
and sandy ridges. In the south-west of the area, peat lands are situated. In the most southern part of 
Oost-Groningen densely forested areas are situated. The cultivation of potatoes takes place on the 
sand grounds in the southern part of the region, the cultivation of cereals mainly takes place on the 
clay grounds in the northern part of the region. Figure 4.1 gives an overview of the case study 
region.  
 
 
Figure 4.1: Dominant land use in case study region Oost-Groningen and the realized Natural Ecological 
Network (or EHS in Dutch) (reference year 2010)   
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Table 4.1 gives an overview of the main characteristics of the region, and gives information on the 
farm population selected for this study. 
 
Table 4.1: General information on Oost-Groningen  
General information Oost-Groningen (Corop region), reference year 2010 
Municipalities Oldambt, Menterwolde, Bellingwedde, Vlagtwedde, Pekela, 
Veendam 
Total number of farms in the area in 2010 992 farms 
Total size area Appr. 85.000 ha 
Total number of arable farms 564 farms 
Most common group:  
Starch potato farmers (NEG type 1410) 
234 farms 
Land used by arable farmers 38386 ha (incl. stables, homestead, farms with land outside the 
area) 
Main soil types Sea clay, Pleistocene sand, peat, loamy soil,  
Most common crops Starch potatoes, sugar beets, cereals 
 
For the case study Oost-Groningen in SERA, the landscape was stylised by limiting to only two soil 
types: Pleistocene sand and sea clay soil. For the case study the cultivation of three types of crops 
is taken into account: starch potatoes, cereals and sugar beets. These three crops are chosen 
because they represent the major production options available to arable farmers in Oost-Groningen 
(own Agricultural Census analysis). It should be noted that maize, which is also an important crop for 
arable farmers in Oost-Groningen is not taken into account in the model for reasons of simplicity.  
This means that five types of land use are applied for the case study Oost-Groningen: starch potato 
production (either sand or clay soil), sugar beet production (either sand or clay soil), cereals 
production (either sand or clay soil), arable land with AESs or 7% EFAs, and nature conservation 
areas (National Ecological Network, Natura 2000 areas). 
 
4.1.2 The arable farm agent in SERA  
To characterize the arable farm agent in SERA, it is useful to first describe why arable farm agents 
do what they do and based on what. For this study, 564 arable farms were selected from Agricultural 
Census data (reference year 2010). Together, these farms use approximately 60% of all agricultural 
land present in the area. Main soil types of the land used by the population of farmers selected for 
the case study is sea clay and sand, and these two types of soil are selected for analysis in SERA. 
Later on, we will see that a distinction is made in maximum allowed manure supply for both soil 
types, as well as for compensatory payments from AESs (see Section 5.3.2 and Appendix I).  
 
Arable farm agents can produce a selection of goods (crops or on-farm nature). They can also 
engage in land rental activities. In the model, we simulate the actions and interactions of autonomous 
agents (both individual and collective entities) with a view to assessing their effects on the system as 
a whole. Arable farm agents are assumed to attain the highest possible operational farm profit. The 
decision making of the modeled farms is highly simplified compared to that of real farmers in Oost-
Groningen, and only serves the purpose of this study. For example, strategic aspects such as 
speculation on land between farmers is not included in the model, as well as fluctuation of input and 
output prices, future expectations about an uncertain political environment etc. With respect to 
expectations of farm agents, they anticipate to price changes in the same period, taking into account 
the prices from the previous periods.  
 
An arable farm agent is handed over to the next generation after a given number of periods (≥ 65 
years), unless there is no successor. Finally, arable farm agents differ with respect to their farm size 
in terms of parcels, number of crops grown, soil quality, spatial location, as well as age. In this way 
the identity of the arable farm agent is constituted.  
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As stated before, the arable farm agent’s objective is to attain the highest possible operational farm 
profit, given the information the farm agent has. Although no explicit linear optimization problem is 
used in SERA because of heterogeneous parcels used, the farm agents’ objective function can be 
expressed in the following way: Operational arable farm profit is based on the sum of the contribution 
of each individual parcel (𝑖) and all crops grown (𝑗) on land controlled by the farm agent, based on 
the following function (2) 
∑
=
=
n
i
ij
arable
farm YY
1
 (2) 
 
For each parcel the profit ( ijY ) is calculated based on the following function  
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Crop production revenue PYij for starch potato production, sugar beet production and cereals are
 
determined by local variations (i.e. low crop yields because of low soil quality) at parcel level. Crop 
prices jp  are determined exogenously for each individual crop (starch potatoes, sugar beets, 
cereals), and is treated as exogenous in the model. Local variation in prices due to for instance 
quality differences among farmers is not permitted in this model, meaning that all producers receive 
the same exogenous product price. Farm agents start their crop rotation scheme with the crop they 
grow on the respective parcel in 2010 based on initial GIS land use maps, distributed by the Ministry 
of EZ. This means each parcel follows its own crop rotation sequence. Table 4.2 gives an overview 
of the main parameters in the arable farm model 
 
Table 4.2 Main model parameters arable farm agent  
Description Unit of analysis Parameter 
Production yields for the three crops j Ton/ha 𝑃𝑌𝑖𝑗 
Yield losses for the parcel and three crops j % point 𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑗 
Production per hectare for three crops j Ton/ha 𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑗 
Fertilizer costs on the parcel for crop j Euro/parcel 𝐹𝐶𝑖𝑗 
Fertilizer application for three crops j Ton/ha 𝐹𝑈𝑗 
Product sell price for three crops j Euro/ton 𝑝𝑗 
Manure application revenue depending on crop j Euro/kg N 𝑀𝐴𝑗 
Cultivation costs for three crops j Euro/ton 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑗 
Transport costs depending on parcel and crop j Euro/parcel 𝑇𝑅𝐶𝑖𝑗 
SNL subsidy sand Euro/ha 𝑆𝑖
𝑠𝑎𝑛𝑑 
SNL subsidy clay Euro/ha 𝑆𝑖
𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑦 
SNL contract length Years 6 
SNL fertilizer allowance Kg N/ha 0 
SNL nitrogen allowance Kg N/ha 0 
Cultivation costs for SNL parcel Euro 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑗
𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 
Transport costs for SNL parcel Euro 𝑇𝑅𝐶𝑖𝑗
𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 
Discount rate for lowering transport costs for SNL 
parcels 
% point 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 
Expectation price for greening permit Euro/permit 𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡  
Reserve price for greening permit Euro/permit 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡  
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Based on the relative production hectares of the three primary field crops, all farms in the simulation 
are assumed to determine their annual crop mix based on the sequence 1:2 (year 1: starch 
potatoes; year 2: sugar beets; year 3: starch potatoes; year 4: cereals). The ‘Vroegrooiregeling 
Noord-NL’6 makes it possible to cultivate potatoes in such an intensive way. When potatoes are 
harvested before 10th July, the chance for contamination with cyst nematodes is minimized. One 
should note that we distinguish only one type of crop rotation scheme for simplicity reasons. In 
reality, more types of crop rotation (i.e. only cereals and sugar beets on sea clay soil) are observed.  
 
Crop production revenues for the three selected crops are based on the average yields for the 
reference year 2010 (CBS & LEI, 2011). Each arable farm agent keeps track of its nitrogen balance 
on farm and parcel level. For each crop grown on a parcel, a fixed amount of nitrogen/ha is assumed 
to be used in accordance to the Dutch legal manure regulations (CBS, 2010). In the SERA model, for 
each individual crop per soil type, specific norms are applied. These norms are used in SERA (see 
Appendix I). Arable farm agents earn revenue from applying animal manure on their parcels. We 
assume that all farmers apply the maximum legal norm on their parcels, given the soil type (either 
sea clay or sand). The price that arable farm agents receive for manure application is based on the 
average manure disposal price, which we based on the average price paid for manure disposal in 
2010 (CBS, 2010). In reality, a distinction can be made between different types of animal manure, 
stemming either from cows, poultry or pigs. For reasons of simplicity we take the average disposal 
price, which was also used in the ‘Koeien en Kansen’ LEI-ASG project. The price for chemical fertilizer 
in the model is fixed (Verloop et al., 2009). Furthermore, we assume a fixed cultivation costs per 
hectare, thereby taking into account the costs for sowing, harvesting etc. Also transport costs are 
distinguished, which depend on the distance from the parcel to the farmstead (in kilometers) and 
depend on the type of crop.  
 
For detailed information on the parameters used, we refer to Appendix I. Parameters with respect to 
7% EFAs and AESs will be explained in Section 5.3 and Section 5.4.  
 
 
4.2 Dairy farming in Winterswijk 
4.2.1 Description of the study area 
The second case study is carried out in the agricultural region Winterswijk which is located in the 
eastern part of the Netherlands. From a landscape perspective, the area represents a highly valued 
cultural-historic landscape where small-scale agriculture and nature areas are closely related 
providing particular cultural, recreational, ecological and economic value to the region (Provincie 
Gelderland, 2005). The spatial structure of the landscape attributes are characterized as small fields 
surrounded by hedges or wooded banks (Mastboom, 1996). The size of the area is approximately 
22000 ha, in which 634 farms are present (reference year 2010). The most important agricultural 
sector in the region is dairy farming. 60% of the main production area in the region is used for 
specialized dairy farming, with an average production intensity of approximately 12.000 kg milk per 
ha-1 (Korevaar et al., 2006). 
 
Figure 4.2 gives an overview of the case study region.  
 
                                                   
6 See information on website of Dutch Arable Product Board 
http://www.productschapakkerbouw.nl/files/Toelichting_aanvraag_controle_vroegrooi_2009.pdf 
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Table 4.3 gives an overview of the main characteristics of the region, and gives information on the 
sample selected for this study. 
 
Table 4.3: General information on Winterswijk 
General information Winterswijk, reference year 2010 
Municipalities Winterswijk, Aalten, Oost Gelre, Berkelland 
Total number of farms in the area in 2010 634 farms 
Total size area Appr. 22.000 ha 
Most common group:  
Dairy farms (NEG type 4110) 
201 farms 
Land used by dairy farmers (only grassland and maizeland) 6286 ha 
Main soil type Sand, Peat 
Most common crops Grass, maize, cereals 
 
4.2.2 The dairy farm agent in SERA  
For this study, 201 specialized dairy farms were selected from Agricultural Census data (reference 
year 2010). Together, these farms use approximately 60% of all agricultural land present in the area. 
Main soil type present on land used by the sample of farmers is sand, and only this soil type is 
selected for analysis in SERA. Dairy farm agents can produce milk, grass, maize or biodiversity. They 
can also engage in land rental activities. Like in Oost-Groningen, the decision making of the modeled 
farms is highly simplified compared to that of real farmers in Winterswijk, and only serves the 
purpose of this study. Also for dairy farm agents it holds that the farm is handed over to the next 
generation after a given number of periods (≥ 65 years), unless there is no successor. Dairy farms 
differ with respect to their farm size in terms of parcels, number of cows, hectares of maize grown, 
soil quality, spatial location as well as age (yes/no successor). In this way the identity of the dairy 
farm agent is constituted.  
Figure 4.2: The study region Winterswijk 
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Same as for the arable farm agents, dairy farm agents’ objective is to attain the highest possible 
operational farm profit, given the information the dairy farm agent has. Although no explicit linear 
optimization problem is used in SERA because of heterogeneous parcels used, the farm agents’ 
objective function can be expressed in the following way: Operational dairy farm profit is based on 
the sum of the contribution of each individual parcel (𝑖) and crops grown (𝑗) (either grass or maize) on 
land controlled by the farm agent, based on the following function (5): 
∑
=
=
n
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ij
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farm YY
1  (5)
 
 
For each parcel the profit ( ijY ) is calculated based on the following function  
),,,,,,,,( / fertilizerdisposeymanureappljmilkiiiiiijij ppppFBFCMARTRCSDIY  (6) 
With 
iiiiiijij FBFCTRCMARSDIY −−−++=  (7) 
 
Revenue from dairy production DIij  is calculated as the sum of the number of cows per hectares, set 
at the initial farm level, times the size of the parcel in hectares, times the average milk production 
per cow, which is set in accordance to the average milk production of dairy cows in The Netherlands 
in 2010 (CBS & LEI, 2011). The milk price is given in the model at the average rate in 2010 (CBS & 
LEI, 2011). Local variation in prices due to for instance quality differences among farmers is not 
permitted in the model, meaning that all producers receive the same exogenous product price. 
Table 4.4 gives an overview of the main parameters in the dairy farm model. 
 
Table 4.4: Main model parameters dairy farm agent 
Description Unit of Analysis Parameter 
Fertilizer costs on parcel i Euro/ kg N 𝐹𝐶𝑖 
Manure application revenue (or costs) for parcel i Euro/kg N 𝑀𝐴𝑖 
Transport costs depending on parcel i Euro/ha 𝑇𝑅𝐶𝑖 
Transport costs for SNL parcel Euro/ha 𝑇𝑅𝐶𝑖
𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 
Milk production per cow Kg/cow 𝑞𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑘 
Nitrogen production per cow N kg/cow 𝑁𝑃 
Fertilizer application for two crops (grass or maize) j N kg/ha 𝐹𝑈𝑗 
Mineralisation grassland  N kg/ha 𝑀𝑖 
Yield losses for the parcel i % point 𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖 
Milkprice  Euro/kg 𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑘 
Workability coefficient grassland % 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑠𝑠 
Leaching coefficient grassland % 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑠𝑠 
NEL (feed) requirements per dairy cow NEL/cow 𝑁𝐸𝐿 
SNL subsidy for parcel i Euro/ha 𝑆𝑖  
SNL contract length  year 6 
Nitrogen application crop j (maize)  N kg/ha 𝑁𝐴𝑗 
Feed production crop j (maize) NEL 𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑗 
Fertilizer application crop j (maize) N kg/ha 𝐹𝐴𝑗 
Maximum number of cows per hectare Cows/ha 𝑟𝑐𝑜𝑤 
Expectation price for greening permit Euro/permit 𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡  
Reserve price for greening permit Euro/permit 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡  
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Each dairy farm agent is restricted to production of two major crops: grass and maize. These two 
crops are chosen because they represent the major production options available to dairy farmers in 
Winterswijk (own Agricultural Census analysis). It should be noted that this study focuses on dairy 
farmers in Winterswijk, and that other important sectors such as arable farming are not taken into 
account in the model for simplicity reasons. Each farm agent keeps track of its own nitrogen balance 
on parcel and farm level. Nitrogen production for all dairy cows held on the farm is known, as well as 
nitrogen production on parcel level (based on the number of cows/ha, taken from Agricultural Census 
data). At farm level, nitrogen is disposed on grassland and maizeland. Fertilizer use is fixed on 
grassland. The total grass production (dry matter yield) per parcel is calculated based on the 
available nitrogen (given the legal norms) and soil type based on studies of Aarts & Middelkoop 
(1990), Aarts (1996), Middelkoop (2007) and Peerlings & Polman (2008).  
 
Each dairy cow has a fixed feed requirement, based on key numbers of the Ministry of EZ. Costs for 
manure disposal (in case of a surplus at farm level) are fixed and an average price (based on CBS & 
LEI, 2011) is used. At farm level farm agents also keep track of a feed balance. When more feed is 
produced on farm level (stemming from relation nitrogen balance and grass production functions) the 
farm agent is able to sell feed. When there is a lack of feed at farm level, the farm agent is able to 
buy external feed. Transport costs represent the costs for machinery, manure and cattle transport to 
the parcels. For parcels where maize is grown, also manure can be disposed, and transport costs 
are needed too. For both the feed- and manure balance different prices for shortages and surpluses 
are used, assuming a 10% lower price when manure is attracted externally, and a 10% lower price 
when feed is sold externally.  
 
For detailed information on the parameters used, we refer to Appendix II. Parameters with respect to 
7% EFAs and AESs will be explained in Section 5.3 and Section 5.4. 
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5 Scenarios 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the scenarios that have been simulated using the 7% EFA measure and AESs 
measure. Furthermore, we discuss how we bring the 7% EFA measure and the AESs into the model.  
 
Table 5.1 summarizes the scenarios taking into account both measures. For each measure, two 
different types of implementation will be simulated: collective decision-making vs. individual decision-
making.   
 
Table 5.1: Scenarios simulated with SERA taking into account both measures, experimenting with 
collective and individual decision-making. 
Scenario Name Explanation 
0 Base 
No policies  
- No AESs  
- No EFAs  
- Farm agents interact on the land market 
1  
(Section 5.2) 
Scenario based on current 
EC proposal:  
 
7% Ecological Focus Areas 
measure obligation for each 
individual farmer 
- farmers are obliged to transform 7% of their land into 
ecological focus area 
- Free to choose whatever parcel  
- EFAs parcels result in no yield and no room for manure 
disposal  
 
2  
(Section 5.3) 
Collective implementation 
of 7% ecological focus area 
measure:  
 
Environmental cooperative 
facilitates exchange of 
‘greening permits’ between 
farmers within the region 
- farmers are obliged to assign 7% ecological focus area 
- Environmental cooperative facilitates exchange between 
farmers within the region, reflected in SERA as tradable 
‘greening permits’ (transferable obligations).  
- In this way we try to grasp the social processes 
between farmers and collective: Farmers are allowed to 
trade their 7% obligation within the region 
- Allocation basis: profit maximization, irrespective of 
ecological quality 
 
3  
(Section 5.4) 
Scenario based on agri-
environmental contracting 
following the current 
situation in Pillar II:  
 
Agri-environmental contracting 
on field margins (for Oost-
Groningen) and on parcel level 
(Winterswijk), in areas 
designated by the government  
- Fixed payment/ha, irrespective of parcel characteristics 
- Province assigns parcels 
4  
(Section 5.5) 
Collective implementation 
of Pillar II agri-
environmental contracting:  
 
Selection of contracted parcels 
by environmental cooperative 
based on ‘ecopoints-score’ for 
each parcel 
  
- Collective decides based on ‘ecopoint-score’  for each 
parcel which parcels should be contracted given budget 
constraints 
- Spatial cohesion Reilly index is calculated in each 
subsequent period, updating for nature areas and 
contracted agri-environment parcels in the surrounding 
areas 
- Flexible payment/ha based on ecopoints, including a 
bonus to reflect the power of cooperatives with regard 
to ecological knowledge, and encouraging and 
persuasive behavior 
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In this study we compare the scenarios with a base scenario (scenario 0) in which no 7% EFAs 
measure is applicable and no possibilities exist for agri-environmental contracting. In the base 
scenario, farm agents only interact on the land market by offering and attracting parcels based on 
their age, the availability of a successor and the opportunity costs. In the remaining chapter we will 
discuss the four policy scenarios and their implementation in the model in detail.   
 
 
5.2 7% EFA scenario based on current EC proposals (scenario 1) 
According to the EC proposals with respect to direct payments (EC, 2011a), farmers are obliged to 
use 7% of their land as Ecological Focus Areas by turning those areas into fallow land, landscape 
features, buffer strips or afforested areas. Given the European and national debates that are still 
going on with respect to the actual implementation and management conditions for EFAs, as 
indicated in Chapter 2, assumptions on EFAs are needed. In this study we assume that EFAs are 
applicable to both arable land and grassland. This assumption diverges from the EU proposals, as 
they state that EFAs are only applicable to arable land and temporary grassland. We motivate this 
choice by the fact that the former State Secretary Bleker expressed the wish that not only arable 
land should be fulfilling for EFAs, but also grassland (see Van Doorn et al., 2012). Furthermore, we 
assume that EFAs are only applicable to complete parcels, and not to parts of arable land such as 
buffer strips, for reasons of model simplicity. This results in two separate definitions of 7% EFAs, 
applicable to the case study areas Oost-Groningen and Winterswijk: 
 
For the case study Oost-Groningen 
7% EFAs are parcels of arable land that are eligible for direct payments and that are not used for 
agricultural production, but are managed for ecological purposes. 
 
For the case study Winterswijk 
7% EFAs are parcels of grassland that are eligible for direct payments and that are not used for 
agricultural production, but are managed for ecological purposes. 
 
To implement the obligatory conversion of 7% agricultural land into on-farm nature in the model, the 
following assumptions are made: 
• Each farm agent is willing to participate in the 7% EFAs measure, and tries to satisfy the 
obligatory measure. No fines are modeled in SERA. 
• Greening permits take place on whole parcels for both Winterswijk and Oost-Groningen. 
• Yield losses because of 7% EFA measures are 100%. 
• No compensatory payments are given for conversion of land to satisfy the 7% EFAs measure. 
• Total number of 7% EFA obligations on the farm is equal to 7% of the size of the farm (in 
hectares). 
 
When assuming that each farm has to assign 7% of its own parcels for biodiversity purposes, the 
following steps are taken by the farm agent in each period to determine the total number of 7% EFA 
obligations at farm level:  
1. Take the sum of the present parcels with AESs. 
2. When this is <7% of the farm size, the farm agent ranks all owned parcels from lowest to highest 
yield. 
3. The parcels with lowest yield are selected subsequently until 7% EFA is reached. 
Exploring green agricultural policy scenarios with a spatially explicit agent-based model 41 
5.3 Collective implementation of 7% ecological focus area 
measure (scenario 2)  
As indicated in Chapter 2, the Dutch government wants to investigate the role of environmental 
cooperatives in executing the greening measures and their potential effectiveness. In this study we 
therefore investigate the impact of a potential role for environmental cooperatives in the 
implementation of 7% EFAs.  
 
The current proposal, in which each farm is obliged to turn 7% of its production area into on-farm 
nature is compared to an alternative in which the environmental cooperative facilitates exchange 
between farmers. We simulate this facilitating role by introducing a market for so called ‘greening 
permits’. A greening permit is the right/obligation for conversion of 1 hectare of land into on-farm 
nature which makes a permit a homogenous product. The exchange of greening permits is 
represented by a market in which multiple demanders and suppliers act at the same time. Some 
arable farms will assign more land than the obligatory 7% for biodiversity purposes, attract ‘greening 
permits’ from the exchange market and receive a compensatory payment in return. Farmers can fulfil 
the 7% EFAs obligation with ‘greening permits’ only, both greening permits and own land, or they can 
fulfil their obligation on their own land only. Parcels with AES are also included in the 7% EFAs 
measure. This means that:  
 
7% EFA requirement on farm level = AESs + greening permits + EFAs on own land 
 
In the model, to fulfil the 7% EFAs obligation, farm agents will first try to contract parcels under 
AESs. If that does not fulfil the obligation, the farm agent tries to offer his ‘greening permits’ for 
exchange. Then, if the obligation is not fulfilled yet, the farm agent will assign 7% of his own land for 
7% EFAs. Whether all the before mentioned steps will be taken depends on the expectation price on 
the exchange market, and depends on the characteristics of the individual parcels. Permits collected 
from the exchange market are valid for one year. We assume that the permits offered by a farm 
agent is transferred as a complete set, and cannot be divided; for example, when a farm agent 
offers 3.8 ha on the exchange market, this amount can only be transferred to another farm agent in 
total, and cannot be divided.  
 
If a farm agent offers the permit on a virtual market (bids), other farm agents can apply for the 
permits (asks). Bids are collected by the environmental cooperative and are matched with the asks 
based on the highest price. The farm agent with the ‘winning’ bid receives a payment for applying 
conservation for the extra converted parcel. The buyer and seller surplus is equally divided in the 
default setting of the model: 
 
• BIDS: Bids are constituted by farmers that want to trade permits because they can acquire a 
higher revenue from conventional production on the parcel when comparing with switching to on-
farm nature management. They will pay a compensatory payment to the farmers that will convert 
extra land for ecological purposes. The size of the compensatory payment is equal to the 
difference between the revenue from conventional production (see Section 4.1 for arable farming 
and Section 4.2 for dairy farming)  and the revenue from production when switching to assigning 
land for 7% EFA ecological purposes.  
 
𝑏𝑖𝑑𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 = 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔 − 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛 
 
Permits are only traded when the expected price is larger than the reserve price. The expected 
price is equal to the average price paid for permits on the market in the past two periods.  
 
𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡 = 𝑝𝑡−1𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡+𝑝𝑡−2𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡
2
  (8) 
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The reserve price is equal to the revenue that would be generated from conventional production. 
The revenue from the last four years is taken into account (given the crop rotation scheme 1:2 for 
arable farmers in Oost-Groningen, see Section 4.1).  
 
𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡 = 𝜋𝑖 = 𝑌𝑖 𝑡+1𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑝+𝑌𝑖 𝑡+2𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑌𝑖 𝑡+3𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑝+𝑌𝑖 𝑡+4𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑝4  (9) 
 
• ASKS: Asks are generated by farmers that want to attract additional permits for on-farm nature 
management because conventional production on their land results in smaller revenue than the 
revenue generated from the permits. The price they ask for executing permits on their land is 
equal to the minimum of the expected price and their reserve price.  
 
𝑎𝑠𝑘𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 = min (𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒, 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒) (10) 
 
Here, it holds that first the total of 7% EFAs permits must be fulfilled on the farm, before trade in 
permits is possible. As stated before, AESs are part of this 7%.  
 
In the model the environmental cooperative collects all bids and asks and matches the highest bid 
with the highest ask. When a match is made, the exchange of permits lasts for one year. This means 
the farm agents must meet the 7% EFAs obligations each year. Table 5.2 shows the decisions that 
farmers make with respect to the permit market. 
Table 5.2: Farm agent’s decisions for greening permits 
Parcel is conventional and possibility for greening permit 
Profit conventional parcel Price collected for greening permit Expectation price Decision 
ijY  < 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡  𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡 < 𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡  Offer permit 
ijY < 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡  𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡 > 𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡  Buy permit 
 
The type of auction mechanism which is used to clear the exchange market is essential for the way 
the greening permits are allocated. Clearing means the bids and asks are confronted and actual 
trades take place. The exchange market in SERA is a double auction in which multiple demanders 
and suppliers act on the market at one time, given a homogeneous product. In SERA we make use of 
the 4-heap algorithm proposed by Wurman et al.(1998) which generates efficient and stable matches 
of bids and offers. The key idea of the 4-heap algorithm is to make matches between the best prices. 
To make matches between prices, we make use of the Mth and (M+1)st price rules, which are well 
known in the double auction theory and applications. They define the range of equilibrium prices, 
which balance the market demand and supply. Wurman et al. (1998, p.19) uses the following 
example to explain the importance of the Mth price algorithm: ‘Consider a simple case where there is 
one buyer willing to pay no more than $ x, and one seller willing to accept no less than $ y, with x>y. 
The Mth price is $ x, and the (M+1)st price is $ y. If we set the price for the good above $ x, then 
one agent would be willing to sell it, but no agent would be willing to buy it. At a price below $ y, 
there is demand for one unit but no supply. Only if the price is between $ y and $ x is the excess 
demand zero.’ . This mechanism has been chosen because it simulates a competitive market for 
homogenous goods. This resembles the current policy proposals.  
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5.4 Scenario based on agri-environmental contracting following 
the current situation in Pillar II (scenario 3) 
5.4.1 Agri-environment schemes in Winterswijk 
For the case study Winterswijk, farm agents make a choice in each period for each individual parcel 
between continuing conventional dairy farming (and producing grass), executing AESs, or offering the 
parcel to the land market. Also for new parcels offered on the land market, these choices are made. 
Executing AESs, and receiving a compensatory payment is weighed against the price which could be 
received at the land market (due to high opportunity costs), which is based on the average price on 
the market in the previous two periods, or revenue from conventional production. This mechanism is 
repeated each period for all farmers that have parcels within the search areas for agri-environmental 
contracting, designated by the public authorities. Figure 5.1 gives on overview of these search 
areas, as well as the nature areas present in Winterswijk (Realized NEN 2010). 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Nature areas and search areas designated for agri-environmental contracting in Winterswijk 
 
Table 5.3 summarizes the options of farm agents for each parcel in each simulation period, given the 
scenario based on agri-environmental contracting. 
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Table 5.3: Farm agents’ options for new and owned parcels 
Parcel within search area but currently without contract, or 
contract expires next period 
Decision 
if ijY  < natureY  and if natureY expP<  then offer to land market. 
if ijY < natureY  and if natureY expP>  then sign an AES contract and try to attract more parcels eligible for AESs. 
if ijY > natureY  and if ijY expP<  then offer to land market. 
if ijY > natureY  and if ijY expP≥  then keep parcel conventional and try to attract more parcels. 
Parcel lies outside the search area, no possibility for contract Decision 
  If ijY < expP  then offer to land market. 
  if ijY > expP  then 
keep parcel conventional and try to 
attract more parcels. 
Parcel has contract Decision 
  if natureY < expP  then offer to land market. 
  If natureY > expP  then 
sign an AES contract and try to 
attract more parcels eligible for AESs. 
ijY  =operational profit of conventional parcel 
natureY  =operational profit of parcel with agri-environment scheme 
expP  = expected price of parcel on land market 
 
In the model we assume that AESs can only be applied to grassland parcels. Maize land parcels are 
only used for feed production and manure disposal. When a contract expires, the farm again has the 
opportunity to choose whether conventional or conservation farming is applied to the parcel. When a 
contract is signed, the farmer cannot choose anymore to explore conventional farming on the parcel, 
so only offering the parcel to the land market or continue contracting is possible. No application of 
nitrogen is allowed on the assigned parcels for the contract period of six years. In this study we 
focus on so-called ‘take-it-or-leave-it-contracts’, in which we assume that land owners do not negotiate 
on the conditions. Furthermore, transport costs (in euros/km) are assumed to be lower than for 
conventionally managed parcels as less manure disposal and mowing is needed.  
 
For Winterswijk we focus on AESs that take place on parcel level, focusing on grassland 
management and therefore the following restrictions are valid: 
Beheerpakket  
A.02.01.01Botanisch weideland 
A.02.01.02 Beheerpakket Botanisch hooiland 
- Manure application prohibited 
- Chemical and mechanic weed control is prohibited.  
- Restricted grazing (between 1 August – 1 March, or max. 
1.6 dairy cows per hectare, equal to 2 Dsu7)  
- Payment up to € 1.065,- per ha (botanisch hooiland) or  
€ 1.020,- per ha (botanisch weideland). In SERA we 
assume one level only, namely € 1.065,- per ha. 
 
Farmers are able to trade parcels with AESs because of high opportunity costs, or because of 
retirement (>65 years). In the first period, each farmer makes a choice between the parcels with 
AESs and the conventional grassland parcels. In the following periods, when a contract is chosen, 
the farmer keeps the AESs until the period of 6 years is over. Almost-retired farmers are also able to 
                                                   
7 Dsu (Dutch size unit) is a measure to indicate the economic size of agricultural activities (see also 
http://www3.lei.wur.nl/neg/) 
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Textbox : The Montagu's Harrier  
The Montagu’s Harrier (Circus pygargus) is a migratory bird of prey of the harrier family. The Montagu's 
Harrier is a deceptively small raptor, though it appears larger because of its large wing surface 
compared to small body weight, which gives it a typically buoyant flight. The female is larger than the 
male, however this is not apparent in the field. The diet consists mainly of small ground-living animals in 
areas of low or sparse vegetation. An important part is taken by small rodents, small birds and large 
insects. The goal of ANOG is to improve the bird population on arable land in their working area. They 
focus on certain species: skylark, Montagu’s harrier and partridge. They aim to improve the density of 
the skylark from for instance 5 – 10 birds per 100 ha to 10 – 15 birds per 100 ha. For the Montagu’s 
harrier they try to maintain the density of 35 – 40 couples and increase it by enhancing field margins, 
increase the area of fields margins under management, and improve ‘forgotten’ landscape structures like 
margins along dikes. Improvements for partridge habitat the group plans are increasing insect-rich 
habitats, leaving arable land fallow, or sowing the land with special grasses and grains as fodder for the 
birds. 
 
Source: www.grauwekiekendief.nl; www.anog.nl 
sign an AES contract, when they do not have a successor these parcels will be supplied to the land 
market (see Appendix III). This means that after the first period of the model run there are three 
options that can be chosen by the farmer: 
 
1. Owner of parcel with contract, but contract is expired. Choose whether to extend the contract. 
2. Parcel with contract which is offered to the land market. The bidprice is subject to restrictions for 
nitrogen application, and lower yields.  
3. Parcel is not yet contracted, but there is a possibility, and is offered to the land market. The 
farmer makes a choice between conventional farming and conservation farming  
 
Options 1 and 3 have the same strategy: the farmer makes a choice between conventional farming 
and conservation farming. For option 2 there is an extra restriction on the parcel, which reduces the 
manure and fertilizer application to zero.  
 
5.4.2 Agri-environment schemes in Oost-Groningen 
For Oost-Groningen we focus on an AES aiming at the conservation of field edges for breeding and 
wintering farmland birds. We chose this scheme because two tariffs are used, for clay and sandy 
soil. We take the Nature Management Plan (in Dutch; zoekgebieden weide- en akkervogels), which is 
delineated at Provincial level (in cooperation with the environmental cooperative) as a reference point: 
farmers are able to contract field edges on the assigned parcels. When this is the case, farmers 
have a lower yield from the parcel, as well as manure restrictions.  
 
For Oost-Groningen the following restrictions apply: 
Beheerpakket A01.02.02 Bouwland met 
doortrekkende en overwinterende akkervogels 
- Edges with a width of at least 9 meter, sown with grass, 
wheat, herbs or a mix of herbs.  
- Chemical and mechanic weed control is prohibited.  
- Manure application and grazing are prohibited.  
- Payment up to € 2.028,- per ha for clay and € 1.745,- 
for sandy soil. 
 
A good example of an arable bird that benefits from this type of AESs is the Montagu’s Harrier. In 
Textbox 1, an overview is given of the characteristics of this bird species. 
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We assume that field margins with a minimum width of 9 meters are contracted. We furthermore 
assume that when field margins are contracted, they apply to the entire contour of the parcel with a 
width of 9 meter. We compute the surface that is covered with field margins for each parcel 
individually. Contracted field margins lead to a decrease in production yields (minus 100% is 
assumed), and lower possibilities for manure application. Payment per hectare for sandy soil is 
€  1745 euro per ha; for clay soil 2028 euro/ha. With respect to cultivation costs, we assume that 
they are 20% higher when comparing to conventional farming. Lower costs because of smaller sizes 
of the parcel due to field margin management are discounted in this value. Cultivation costs still 
depend on the type of crop, but are now raised with 20% because of conservation of the field 
margin, sowing botanic mixes on the field margins etc. Furthermore, we assume that transport costs 
for parcels with AESs are lower because of smaller yields resulting in lower transportation. This 
percentage is set at 60% of the original transportation parameter values. Figure 5.2 gives an 
overview of the nature areas (NEN realized in 2010) and the search areas for AESs.  
 
  
Figure 5.2: Nature areas and search areas designated for agri-environmental contracting in Oost-
Groningen  
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Figure 5.2 shows that nature areas are scarce in the case study area Oost-Groningen. Given the 
spatial cohesion Reilly-index that is used by the environmental cooperative to distribute the AESs in 
the area, we want to stress that for Oost-Groningen the cohesion of the habitat network is mainly 
caused by contracted agri-environmental areas, and not so much by the existing nature areas. In the 
first period a farmer makes a choice between conventional arable farming or contracting an AES 
leading to lower yields, but receiving a compensatory payment or offering the parcel to the land 
market due to high opportunity costs. The same rules hold as is explained in Table 5.3. Difference 
with the options of dairy farm agents is that now the crop rotation scheme is taken into account 
when calculating the yield per parcel. Because the revenues from starch potatoes, sugar beets and 
cereals differ, we take the average revenue of the crops grown in the coming four years when 
calculating the operational profit per parcel. This means that the model keeps track of the crops 
grown on each parcel for the future three periods (see eq. 11). This is done to prevent that bid 
prices are too low, because cereals was produced on the parcel in the current year. The farm agent 
also has the possibility to attract parcels, by comparing operational profits for the offered parcels 
and has the opportunity to bid on offered parcels when their bid price is higher than the expectation 
price.  
 
𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑖  𝑜𝑟 𝑌𝑖𝑗 = 𝑌𝑖 𝑡+1𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑝+𝑌𝑖 𝑡+2𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑌𝑖 𝑡+3𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑝+𝑌𝑖 𝑡+4𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑝4  (11) 
 
In the first period, each farmer makes a choice between the parcels with AESs and the conventional 
arable parcels. In the following periods, when a contract is chosen, the farmer keeps the AESs until 
the period of six years is over. Almost-retired farmers are also able to sign a protection contract, 
when they do not have a successor these parcels will be supplied to the land market. This means 
that after the first period of the model run, the same three options are applicable as is discussed 
within the case study Winterswijk.  
 
 
5.5 Collective implementation of Pillar II agri-environmental 
contracting (scenario 4)  
Within SERA, a possibility is included to experiment with collective decision-making with respect to 
contracting AESs. We implemented this opportunity into SERA by giving the environmental 
cooperative a prominent role in the designation and actual contracting of parcels with AES. It is 
expected that an environmental cooperative has more local expertise on where parcels with high 
ecological value and high potential biodiversity are situated. Therefore, in the model complete 
knowledge on ecopoints of individual parcels (see Section 3.2.3) is assumed. Based on these 
ecopoints the environmental cooperative maps within each simulation period where the arable or 
grassland parcels with the highest added value to biodiversity are situated. It is assumed that the 
environmental cooperative receives a fixed budget from Provincial authorities, which can be spend 
according to the own strategy of the cooperative. The only requirement is that the highest possible 
amount of biodiversity must be achieved, given the fixed budget. Then, the environmental 
cooperative virtually consults the particular farm agent and offers a flexible compensatory payment 
based on ecopoints for conversion of the parcel into on-farm nature (see also Schouten et al., 
2013a). The farm agent on its turn makes a choice, which we discussed in detail in Section 5.4.1, 
between continuing conventional farming, contracting an AES and thereby facing decreased yields, 
or offering the parcel to the land market because of high opportunity costs. 
 
With respect to the environmental cooperatives, we assume that the success of delivering AESs in a 
cost-effective way is not entirely linked to the compensatory payment, but also that they raise the 
willingness among farmers to deliver benefits for biodiversity, and resulting landscape amenities. In 
practice, by increasing ecological knowledge among members by providing training courses, they 
may increase the effectiveness of AESs by encouraging farmers to allocate schemes to parcels 
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where they are likely to be most effective (see e.g. Verhulst, Kleijn, & Berendse, 2007, Mills et al., 
2011). To include this success factor for contracting AESs in the model, we assume that the 
environmental cooperative pays an extra bonus, on top of the compensatory payment (see eq. 12).   
 
𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠 = ∆ (𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡,𝑌𝑖𝑗)  (12) 
 
This bonus reflects the persuasive power of the collective body. Figure 5.3 shows a graphical 
explanation of the bonus distributed by the environmental cooperative. On top of the AES payment 
per hectare, a flexible bonus is given which is based on the difference between the conventional 
production revenue from the parcel and the AES payment per hectare.  
 
 
Figure 5.3: Graphical explanation of the bonus given by the environmental cooperative on top of the AES 
payment/ha  
 
In Section 3.2.3 the ecopoints method is discussed which is used by the environmental cooperative 
to designate the parcels with the highest ecological value. To prevent that the environmental 
cooperative contracts parcels purely on the highest number of ecopoints that can be generated on 
the parcel, we correct the bonus that is given on top of the compensatory payment (see equation 
13). For each eligible parcel, the environmental cooperative corrects the bonus based on the highest 
number of ecopoints that can be generated on the parcels. Equation (13) shows how for each parcel 
the bonus is computed (denoted as ‘delta price’) by dividing the number of ecopoints that could be 
generated on the parcel by the conventional production value of the parcel. This ratio is then used in 
the matching process.   
 
𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 = 𝑓(𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑  𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑖
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑖 ) (13) 
 
Now matching of bids and offers is aiming at parcels with the highest ecopoints for the smallest 
possible budget.  
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6 Results 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, an answer is given to the research questions stated in the introduction of this study 
focusing on getting insight into the spatial, ecological, economic impact of applying collective vs. 
individual approaches for both Pillar I  7% EFAs measures and Pillar II AESs. To get a good overview 
of the spatial, ecological and economic impact of both measures, we will analyse the model results 
using the following indicators:   
 
• Biodiversity 
o Development of ecopoints of AESs or 7% EFAs area (see Chapter 3); 
o Area contracted with AESs. 
 
• Socio-economic impact 
o Development of operational farm profits (see Chapter 4) of the farm agents in the population 
during the simulation period; 
o Number of continuing farms during the simulation period. 
 
The results of the four scenarios discussed in Section 5.4 will be shown in this chapter. Each 
scenario is compared with the base scenario, in which no policies are applied. The model is 
simulated for 15 time periods, corresponding to 15 years, starting in the reference year 2010.  
 
 
6.2 7% Ecological focus area measure (scenario 1 and 2) 
6.2.1 General 
In this section, the results of scenario 1 and 2 will be discussed. First, we will shortly repeat what is 
simulated in both scenarios. In scenario 1, the arable farm agents and dairy farm agents are obliged 
to convert 7% of their agricultural land for ecological purposes. In scenario 2, arable farm agents 
and dairy farm agents have the opportunity to exchange the obligatory 7% EFAs measure, by offering 
greening permits on an exchange market facilitated by the environmental cooperative.  
 
Table 6.1 summarizes the results for the base scenario and the two alternative 7% EFAs scenarios 
for the case study areas Oost-Groningen and Winterswijk. Results will be discussed in more detail in 
Sections 6.2.2, 6.2.3 and 6.2.4. 
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Table 6.1: Model results for scenario 1 (current EC proposal) and 2 (collective implementation of 7% 
EFAs) for Oost-Groningen and Winterswijk, average after a 15-year simulation period8 
Indicator Description Unit of 
analysis 
Scenarios 
   0 
Base 
No policies 
1 
Current EC 
proposal 
2 
Collective 
implementation 
of 7% EFAs 
Oost- Groningen      
Biodiversity89 Contracted ecopoints (% 
of total eligible ecopoints) 
% 0 32.4 31.7 
Operational farm 
profit 
Index average operational 
farm profit (base scenario 
= 100) 
% 100 92.8 93.2 
Operating farms Number of operating 
farms (% of initial number 
of operating farms) 
% 24 24 24 
Winterswijk      
Biodiversity Contracted ecopoints (% 
of total eligible ecopoints) 
% 0 53 52 
Operational farm 
profit 
Index average operational 
farm profit (base scenario 
= 100) 
% 100 98.2 98.4 
Operating farms Number of operating 
farms (% of initial number 
of operating farms) 
% 23 23 23 
 
6.2.2 Biodiversity 
Figure 6.1 illustrates the dynamics of the total number of ecopoints generated on parcels taken out 
of production to comply to the 7% EFAs measure for scenario 1 (current EC proposal) and scenario 
2 (collective implementation of 7% EFAs ) in both case study areas (OG means Oost-Groningen; WW 
means Winterswijk), during a simulation period of 15 years.  
 
 
 
Figure 6.1 Total number of ecopoints achieved for scenario 1 (current EC proposal) and 2 (collective 
implementation of 7% EFAs), for Oost-Groningen. 
                                                   
8 One digit is shown for the operational farm profit and biodiversity indicators, to illustrate differences between scenarios. 
Differences between scenarios are relatively small.  
9 The location of the parcels differs over the scenarios.  
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Figure 6.1 shows that the number of ecopoints achieved on the 7% EFAs parcels is slightly lower 
(1.34% lower for scenario 2 in Winterswijk when taking the sum of the number of ecopoints in both 
scenarios, see also Table 6.1) when exchange of greening permits is allowed (scenario 2), compared 
to a situation with no exchange (scenario 1). The difference between the two scenarios in the case 
study area Oost-Groningen is negligible (Figure 6.1 and Table 6.1). The lower number of achieved 
ecopoints can be explained by the assumption that farm agents that exchange greening permits 
search for the parcels with the lowest productivity, irrespective of its contribution to biodiversity (see 
Section 5.3). For simplicity reasons, we chose to simulate an exchange of greening permits purely 
driven by economic reasons. The large increase in ecopoints after period 12 can be explained by the 
large number of farm agents that retire during that year. More land is available on the land market 
and the remaining operating farms increase in size, which leads to more dynamics in the exchange of 
greening permits. The retired farm agents without a successor, that did not manage to supply all of 
their land to the landmarket are still able to attract greening permits in SERA. Given that they do not 
apply agricultural production on their land, they are able to conduct the permits at low cost. Given 
that many retired farm agents apply permits on their land, it is not always the case that these parcels 
are highly valued for biodiversity resulting in a higher number of achieved ecopoints.  
 
Overall, the higher level of achieved ecopoints in Winterswijk compared to Oost-Groningen can be 
explained by the small-scaled characteristics of the landscape. In Winterswijk, the National Ecological 
Network (NEN) of nature areas is larger, and more scattered. Therefore higher ecopoints can be 
achieved in this case study area. Besides the characteristics of the farm population (because of 
retired farm agents applying greening permits), also the characteristics of both case study areas 
cause the small differences between scenario 1 and 2. Clustering of parcels together when 
exchange of greening permits is allowed does also not occur because of the small differences in 
ecopoints between the parcels in both case study areas. The value added for biodiversity of the 
parcels in both case study areas is rather homogeneous, leading to small differences whenever 
exchange of greening permits occurs. In Appendix IV, an example is given on how the number of 
ecopoints differs when comparing both scenarios, resulting in lower number of ecopoints for 
scenario 2. For simplicity reasons, we use the set-up of Figure 3.2, used to explain the spatial 
cohesion Reilly index, as a starting point. 
 
6.2.3 Operational farm profit 
Figure 6.2 shows the development of the average operational profit per farm as an index for both 
case study areas. The first year of the base scenario of both case studies serves as the reference 
year (first simulation year=100%). The other lines represent the percentage change in average 
operational farm profit compared to this reference year. 
 
 
Figure 6.2 Index average operational profit per farm in both case study areas for scenario 1 (current EC 
proposal) and 2 (collective implementation of 7% EFAs) (base scenario=100%) 
%
  
period  
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Figure 6.2 shows for all four scenarios that the implementation of the EFAs measure results in a 
decreasing average operational profit per farm up to a maximum of 7% because agricultural land is 
taken out of production which leads to a loss of revenue from production. Table 6.1 shows that the 
loss of operational farm profit due to implementation of this measure is lower in Winterswijk, 
comparing to Oost-Groningen. This can be explained by the characteristics of the case study area. In 
Winterswijk, nature areas are scattered throughout the case study area, with comparatively more low 
production quality parcels. In Oost-Groningen, parcels are more homogeneous with respect to soil 
quality, with higher production quality parcels. We will illustrate that the 7% EFAs measure can result 
in less than 7% operational farm profit decrease with the following example (Textbox 2): 
  
Textbox 2: Illustrating change in operational farm profit after implementation of 7% EFAs measure 
Imagine a farm with a farm size of 100 hectares. The farmer owns 3 parcels; one parcel of 50 ha, 30 ha and 20 
ha. Table T2.1 shows the revenue from production for the three parcels. 
 
Table T2.1: Example of farm with 100 hectares, using three parcels for agricultural production 
Parcel Size (ha) Revenue/ha (€) Total revenue (€) 
A 50  200 10,000 
B 30 100 3,000 
C 20 10 200 
  Total revenue 13,200 
 
Now the 7% EFAs measure obliges farmers to convert 7% of their agricultural land for biodiversity purposes. 
Assuming that the farmer converts the parcel with the lowest quality (or revenue), this means that 7 hectares will 
be converted for biodiversity purposes, stemming from parcel C. The following revenue from production is 
generated on the farm (Table T2.2). 
 
Table T2.2: Implementation of 7% EFAs measure 
Parcel Size (ha) Revenue/ha (€) Total revenue (€) 
A 50  200 10,000 
B 30 100 3,000 
C 13 10 130 
  Total revenue 13,130 
 
Because of the 7% EFAs measure, the revenue from production is decreased with 0.53%. This example 
illustrates that the 7% EFAs measure can result in a decreasing operational farm profit which is lower than 7%.  
 
Figure 6.2 shows that during the simulation period, an increasing curve is detected for all scenarios. 
The shape of the operational farm profit curves can be motivated by the assumptions made in the 
model in which farm agents try to attain the highest possible operational farm profit while making 
decisions. Given a rapidly decreasing number of active farm agents in the simulation (see Figure 6.3 
for further explanation of the demographic patterns in Oost-Groningen and Winterswijk), and 
increasing scale (in hectares) of the average farm business, the average operational profit per farm 
increases.  
 
As is shown in section 6.2.2, changes in total operational farm profit in the area are relatively small 
when comparing scenario 1 with the collective implementation in scenario 2, in which exchange of 
greening permits is allowed. These results rely heavily on the assumptions made with respect to the 
small differences in initial operational farm profit in the area between farms, and the small number of 
exchanged greening permits when compared to the total number of present parcels, and the total 
number of traded parcels on the landmarket in both case studies. Further, in the model we assume 
that the farm agent that offers a greening permit transfers the complete surplus between revenue 
from conventional production and revenue whenever 7% EFA would be applied to the farm agent that 
attracts the greening permit and performs the extra EFA hectares on his land. In practice, the 
division of this surplus depends on the market power (ratio between number of offering and 
attracting farm agents). For reasons of simplicity we assume that market power is in favor of the 
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attracting farm agents. Further research is needed in order to make this assumption more realistic 
including more differentiation in parcel characteristics, so that more differences are shown between 
the two scenarios. 
 
6.2.4 Operating farms 
When looking at the number of remaining farm agents in the region, we note that demographic 
imbalances threaten the farm populations in Oost-Groningen and Winterswijk. In the Agricultural 
Census of 2010, farmers in both regions were asked for their age, and whether they had a 
successor for their farm. From this data we conclude that the average age of the 564 farmers in 
Oost-Groningen was approximately 55 years old in 2010. With respect to the presence of a 
successor, 24% of the farmers indicated that they had a successor for their farm (Agricultural 
Census 2010, Ministry of Economic Affairs). For Winterswijk, we conclude that the average age of 
the 201 farmers was approximately 51 years old in 2010. With respect to the presence of a 
successor, 24% of the farmers indicated that they had a successor for their farm (Agricultural 
Census 2010, Ministry of Economic Affairs). 
 
When calculating both the EFAs and AESs policy scenarios with the model, we detect no differences 
in the demographic pattern for the simulation period when comparing to the two base scenarios. 
Figure 6.3 shows the annual percentage decrease in the number of operating farm agents in both 
case study areas, as modeled in SERA.  
 
 
 
Figure 6.3 Percentage decrease in operating farm agents in the base scenario (Reference year 0 = 564 
and respectively 201 farms) 
 
Figure 6.3 shows that the number of operating farms decreases during the simulation period. Model 
results show that given the Agricultural Census data, a minor group has a successor (24%), these 
farm agents retire during the simulation period, and they will offer their land to the land market at an 
age of 65.  
 
 
6.3 Agri-environmental measures (scenario 3 and 4) 
6.3.1 General 
In this section we discuss the model results for scenario 3 and 4, simulating the current policy 
situation with respect to AESs and a collective implementation of the AESs. The potential area in 
Oost-Groningen for applying AESs is 2379 hectares (based on the ‘Natuurbeheerplankaart’ of the 
province Groningen). Given the restricted budget of € 300,000 we conclude that only 147 hectares 
% 
period 
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of clay soil or 171 hectares of sandy soil can be contracted with AESs (given the compensatory 
payment of € 2028/ha for clay soil, and € 1745/ha for sandy soil; see Section 5.4). This means 
that approximately 6% (for clay soil) and 7% (for sandy soil) can be contracted. When looking at the 
development of the average operational farm profit given the current budget of € 300.000, results 
show that there are only minor changes in the average operational farm profit when analyzed on the 
regional level. For Winterswijk, also a restricted budget of € 300,000 is available, which results in a 
minority of the eligible AES-area that can be contracted. Given the compensatory payment of 
€ 1065/ha for grassland, only 282 hectares, or 4%, can be contracted of the eligible AES-area of 
6314 hectares (based on the ‘Natuurbeheerplankaart’ of the province Gelderland for the case study 
area). When looking at the development of the average operational farm profit given the budget of 
€ 300.000, results for Winterswijk also show that there are minor changes in the average 
operational farm profit when analyzed on the regional level. In order to show more pronounced 
differences in operational farm profit development, number of hectares contracted and number of 
achieved ecopoints in the two scenarios for the two case studies, we have used a larger maximum 
budget amounting the potential area for AESs times the compensatory payment per hectare. 
 
Textbox 3: AESs budget assumptions scenario 3 and 4 
As is stated in this section, budget assumptions are made in the model in order to show more pronounced 
differences in operational farm profit development, number of hectares contracted and number of achieved 
ecopoints in the two scenarios for the two case studies. We now assumed that the maximum available budget is 
equal to the potential hectares available for AESs (based on the eligigible AES-area shown in the 
‘Natuurbeheerplankaart’ of both regions) times the compensatory payment per hectare. However, this modelling 
assumptions influences the results to a large extend. Because in scenario an extra bonus is given on top of the 
compensatory payment, a larger budget is spend in scenario 4, comparing to scenario 3. Intuitively, if this 
assumption would not have been made, fewer hectares would have been contracted in scenario 4 because 
relatively more budget is spend per hectare than in scenario 3. More research is needed in order to improve this 
modelling assumption. 
 
Table 6.2 summarizes the results for the base scenario and the two alternative AESs scenarios for 
the case study areas Oost-Groningen and Winterswijk. 
 
Table 6.2: Model results for scenario 3 (implementation following current legislation) and 4 (collective 
implementation)  for Oost-Groningen, average after a 15-year simulation period 
Indicator Description Unit of 
analysis 
Scenarios 
   0 
Base 
No policies 
3 
Implementation 
following current 
legislation 
4 
Collective 
implementation 
Oost- Groningen      
Biodiversity Contracted ecopoints (% of 
total eligible ecopoints) 
% 0 26 83 
 Percentage eligible AES-
area contracted 
% 0 52 93 
Operational farm 
profit 
Index average operational 
farm profit (base scenario 
= 100) 
% 100 101 102 
Winterswijk      
Biodiversity Contracted ecopoints (% of 
total eligible ecopoints) 
% 0 6 46 
 Percentage eligible AES-
area contracted 
% 0 21 48 
Operational farm 
profit 
Index average operational 
farm profit (base scenario 
= 100) 
% 100 115 111 
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6.3.2 Biodiversity 
Table 6.2 shows the percentage hectares contracted with AESs, given the potential hectares 
contracted with AESs (=100%). As stated earlier, the budget is determined by the potential area for 
AESs (=100%) times the compensatory payment per hectare. Table 6.2 also shows the average 
achieved ecopoints on contracted AES area for both scenarios after a simulation period of 15 years.  
 
Table 6.2 shows that scenario 4 results in a larger number of hectares contracted with AESs for 
both case study areas, and also results in higher numbers of achieved ecopoints on these contracted 
AESs parcels. The extra bonus that is given to reflect the persuasive power of the collective body 
convinces farm agents to contract extra AESs when comparing to scenario 3. Consequence of the 
persuasive power is that a larger budget is needed in scenario 4 to pay the bonus on top of the 
flexible compensatory payment (see Section 5.4.2). The increase in ecopoints can be explained by 
this larger budget.   
 
6.3.3 Operational farm profit 
Figure 6.4 shows the development of the average operational profit per farm as an index for both 
case study areas, given the available budgets in scenario 3 and 4. The first year of the base scenario 
of both case studies serves as the reference year (first simulation year=100%). The other lines 
represent the percentage change in average operational farm profit compared to this reference year. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.4 Index average operational profit per farm in both case study areas for scenario 3 
(implementation following current legislation) and 4 (collective implementation), given the base scenario 
with no applied policies.  
 
Figure 6.4 shows that during the simulation period, an increasing curve is detected for all scenarios. 
The shape of the operational farm profit curves can be motivated with the same reasoning as used in 
Section 6.2.3. Given the assumptions made in the model with respect to farm agents trying to attain 
the highest possible operational farm profit, and given the decreasing number of operating farms in 
the simulation (see Figure 6.3). 
 
Figure 6.4 shows that during the simulation period, an increasing curve is detected for all scenarios. 
The shape of the operational farm profit curves can be motivated by the assumptions made in the 
model in which farm agents try to attain the highest possible operational farm profit while making 
decisions. Given a rapidly decreasing number of active farm agents in the simulation (see Figure 6.3) 
% 
period 
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the scale of the average farm business increases (in hectares) and the average operational farm 
profit increases. Figure 6.4 and Table 6.2 show for Winterswijk that the average operational profit 
per farm is higher in scenario 3, given the fixed AES payments per hectare. This can be explained by 
the fact that more farm agents can increase their income in scenario 3, because no selections take 
place by the environmental cooperative on parcels with the highest contribution to biodiversity. 
Figure 6.4 and Table 6.2 show that the average operational profit per farm is slightly higher in 
scenario 4 for Oost-Groningen, where the environmental cooperative has a dominant role in assigning 
the AESs. The difference between these two results can be explained by the case study 
characteristics. When comparing both case studies, Winterswijk is characterized by more 
heterogeneous parcels (heterogeneous in size and quality). In Oost-Groningen parcels are larger, and 
more homogeneous with respect to size and quality. Therefore, scenario 4 will result in higher 
operational farm profit in Oost-Groningen because more budget is allocated in the area. However, in 
Winterswijk the opposite occurs, because the environmental cooperative is determined to contract 
the parcels with the highest value added to biodiversity. Therefore, the budget (including the bonus) 
will be spend on less parcels, but with achieving higher ecopoints.  
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7 Reflection 
This report explores the spatial, ecological and economic impact of environmental cooperative 
decision-making for the European Commission’s legislative proposals for the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) 2014-2020 on farmers, their land use and their surroundings. The analysis is based on 
scenarios with a spatially explicit rural agent-based model (SERA) that explicitly models farmers, their 
socio-economic decision-making, their land use, and the landscape of which their farms are part. We 
illustrate the approach by comparing two rural policies aiming at biodiversity conservation while 
experimenting with two alternative management regimes: one based on centrally governed rules, and 
the other on rules of cooperative decision-making. We applied the model to two case study areas: 
Oost-Groningen and Winterswijk. These areas were chosen because of their differing characteristics: 
Oost-Groningen is dominated by large-scale arable farming with nature areas outside the region. 
while Winterswijk is dominated by small-scale dairy farms with small fields nearby nature areas. The 
very different character of the two case studies makes them interesting to compare from a policy 
perspective. Furthermore, both areas are engaged in regional pilot projects with self-management by 
environmental cooperatives. 
 
The first part of the scenario analysis focused on the ‘greening measure’ Ecological Focus Areas, in 
which farmers are obliged to convert 7% of their agricultural production land for biodiversity 
purposes. Two alternative scenarios were simulated were simulated, the first one assuming that 
farmers oblige to the measure by converting 7% of their own land into Ecological Focus Area. The 
second one assuming that the environmental cooperative facilitates exchange between farmers 
within the region, through arranging transferable obligations between farmers. Given that the precise 
design of the 7% EFAs measure is still under development, it is expected that actual decisions made 
by policy makers with respect to the EFAs measure will be different from our assumptions. Still, this 
study provides insights into possible ways of implementing EFAs, and illustrates what possible 
impacts might occur.  
 
The second part of the analysis addresses agri-environment measures (AESs) within the second pillar 
of the CAP. Within the proposed changes for Pillar II, the European Commission aims at promoting 
more specific and targeted measures through environmental cooperatives. Therefore also two 
alternative scenarios were simulated, the first considering agri-environmental contracting as it is now, 
with a fixed payment/ha, irrespective of the parcel characteristics. The second one assumes an 
important role for the environmental cooperative that uses their local knowledge to decide which 
parcels are contracted with agri-environment schemes given budget constraints and given their 
contribution to biodiversity. 
 
For the 7% EFAs measure, the indicators showed to be influenced by the assumptions in the model, 
the characteristics of both case study areas, and by the characteristics of the farm population. In 
scenario 2, the behavior of the biodiversity indicator was influenced by the fact that parcels can be 
converted for biodiversity purposes irrespective of their spatial configuration in the surrounding 
landscape. We conclude that the contribution of cooperative arrangements to biodiversity can 
improve substantially if eligible parcels for 7% EFAs were to be dependent on their contribution to the 
ecological network at landscape level. This means that coordination of environmental cooperatives 
cannot rely on simple spot market based mechanisms. Therefore more procedures will be 
necessary. This confirms the conclusion of Polman (2002) where it is argued that solutions that work 
well for transactions on spot markets will not work for wildlife and landscape management 
contracting by farmers and further model development is needed. The potential biodiversity results 
of the AESs measure showed to be largely influenced by the characteristics of the case study areas, 
mainly caused in Winterswijk by nature areas that are scattered throughout the case study area with 
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more heterogeneous parcel qualities than were found in Oost-Groningen. Furthermore, case study 
characteristics also influenced the number of operating farms. Ageing of the farm population, 
together with the small number of available successors dominated the decreasing trend of operating 
farms in both regions. Also the way we modeled the farm agent played a large role here, as we did 
not include the opportunity for new farm agents to start a farm practice, or the possibility to find a 
successor during the simulation. Furthermore, also the size of the assumed income transfers from 
one farm agent to another in scenario 1 and 2, and the assumptions made with respect to the 
available budget influenced the results to a large extend. Further research to improve these 
assumptions is needed. Given that the assumptions built into the model strongly influenced the 
behavior of the indicators, we conducted a sensitivity analysis for those parameters (see Schouten et 
al., 2013b). Unfortunately, a sensitivity analysis for the 7% EFAs measure has not yet been carried 
out and requires an extensive discussion which is out of the scope of this study. In line with New 
Institutional Economics theory and the attributes of the transaction it follows that hybrid 
arrangements are appropriate for environmental cooperatives. Hybrid governance arrangements 
consist of elements both of markets and hierarchies. However, other means of co-ordination are 
used besides prices and hierarchy, such as reciprocity and trust (see Polman, 2002). 
 
We conclude that this novel approach holds promise as a way to explore the impact of environmental 
cooperative decision making on rural areas. The modelling approach used in this report integrates 
both the natural environment and the socio-economic component at a detailed level. Farm agents can 
be included in  the model with heterogeneous characteristics, and can participate in social networks 
through the environmental cooperative. In this way insight is gained into the complex dynamics of 
rural areas while imposing different types of policy instruments with different types of management 
regimes to the system. These insights can be valuable for rural policy makers and managers to 
evaluate what the impact is of potential policies, and to gain insight into the impact of environmental 
cooperatives, while aiming at creating sustainable rural development. For policy relevance, a next 
step would be to experiment with different rules for exchanging EFAs. 
 
Future developments of the model are important to improve the practical use of the results to 
support more detailed policy development. Now we focus on one agricultural sector for each case 
study (arable farming for Oost-Groningen and dairy farming for Winterswijk). It would be interesting to 
take into account both arable and dairy farming sectors in both case studies. By mixing the sectors 
the influence of diversity can be investigated and its effects on exchanging EFAs. Furthermore, it 
would be interesting to take into account more crop rotation schemes, depending on different soil 
types. We now assume one crop rotation scheme in Oost-Groningen, taking place on both sandy and 
clay soils. In reality, this is more sophisticated (i.e. 1:2 scheme with cereals and sugar beets on clay 
soil). With regard to the farm agent’s behavior, we currently focus on limitedly rational behavior. It 
would be interesting to experiment with different farm behavioral models, representing different 
types of farms and taking into account more elements relevant for allocating EFA and agri-
environmental schemes. With respect to the biodiversity indicator and governance mechanism of the 
collective, used in this study we conclude that they are pretty rough and should be developed further 
i.e. through the role of habitat quality of particular species or on specific locations and the way in 
which collectives operate. Future developments of more sophisticated biodiversity indicators could 
add to the informative use of the model for studying ecological dynamics while different policy 
measures are implemented. 
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Appendix I: Detailed description behavioural rules arable farm 
agent 
To characterize the arable farm agent, it is useful to first describe why arable farm agents do what 
they do and based on what. That is, this Appendix will first describe an arable farm agent’s behavior 
and the goal of its actions before describing the arable farm agent’s actions themselves. Arable farm 
agents can produce a selection of goods. They can also engage in land rental activities. Arable farm 
agents are assumed to act autonomously and their objective is to attain the highest possible 
operational farm profit, given the information the farm agent has. Although no explicit linear 
optimization problem is used in SERA because of heterogeneous parcels used, the farm agents’ 
objective function can be expressed in the following way: Operational arable farm profit is based on 
the sum of the contribution of each individual parcel (𝑖) and all crops grown (𝑗) on land controlled by 
the farm agent, based on the following function (1) 
∑
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s.t. 
 
Table I-1 gives an overview of the main parameters in the arable farm model 
  
Table I- 1: Main model parameters arable farm agent  
Description Unit of analysis Parameter 
Production yields for the three crops j Ton/ha 𝑃𝑌𝑖𝑗 
Yield losses for the parcel and three crops j % point 𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑗 
Production per hectare for three crops j Ton/ha 𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑗 
Fertilizer costs on the parcel for crop j Euro/parcel 𝐹𝐶𝑖𝑗 
Fertilizer application for three crops j Ton/ha 𝐹𝑈𝑗 
Product sell price for three crops j Euro/ton 𝑝𝑗 
Manure application revenue depending on crop j Euro/kg N 𝑀𝐴𝑅𝑗 
Cultivation costs for three crops j Euro/ton 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑗 
Transport costs depending on parcel and crop j Euro/parcel 𝑇𝑅𝐶𝑖𝑗 
SNL subsidy sand Euro/ha 𝑆𝑖
𝑠𝑎𝑛𝑑 
SNL subsidy clay Euro/ha 𝑆𝑖
𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑦 
SNL contract length Years 6 
SNL fertilizer allowance Kg N/ha 0 
SNL nitrogen allowance Kg N/ha 0 
Cultivation costs for SNL parcel Euro 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑗
𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 
Transport costs for SNL parcel Euro 𝑇𝑅𝐶𝑖𝑗
𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 
Discount rate for lowering transport costs for SNL parcels % point 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 
Expectation price for greening permit Euro/permit 𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡  
Reserve price for greening permit Euro/permit 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡  
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Y ield losses related to soil quality 
For each parcel the yield losses due to low soil quality is known based on GIS-maps of watertables, 
soil quality and soil suitability provided by Alterra. For each parcel a percentage yield loss is known 
for the three crops grown. These yield losses influence the crop production revenue on each 
individual parcel (see (4)).  
 
𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑗 = 𝑓(𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ ,𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑔𝑎𝑟 ,𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙) (4) 
 
Crop production revenue starch potatoes 
Crop production revenue from starch potatoes is calculated based on the average yield of starch 
potatoes (in kg/ha) in (CBS & LEI). For the area ‘Veenkolonien and Oldambt’, we see that the average 
yield in kg per hectare is equal to 39863 kg/ha. The price per 100 kg is equal to the price/100 kg 
off-farm given the in water weight of 400 gram, which is 5.05 per 100 kg (0.051 euro/kg).  
𝑝𝑗 = 𝑓(𝑝𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ , 𝑝𝑠𝑢𝑔𝑎𝑟 , 𝑝𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙) (5) 
𝑝𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ = 0.051 
𝑃𝑌𝑗 = 𝑓(𝑃𝑌𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ ,𝑃𝑌𝑠𝑢𝑔𝑎𝑟 ,𝑃𝑌𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙 ) (6) 
 
𝑃𝑌𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ = (𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑗 ∙ 𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ ∙ 𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ) ∙ 𝑝𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ (7) 
𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ = 39863 
 
Crop production revenue sugar beets 
For sugar beets, the average yield in kg/ha is equal to 69000 kg/ha in 2010. The price per 1000kg 
is equal to 43 euro per ton (0.043 euro/kg)(CBS & LEI, 2011). 
 
𝑃𝑌𝑠𝑢𝑔𝑎𝑟 = (𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑗 ∙ 𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑠𝑢𝑔𝑎𝑟 ∙ 𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑔𝑎𝑟) ∙ 𝑝𝑠𝑢𝑔𝑎𝑟 (8) 
𝑝𝑠𝑢𝑔𝑎𝑟 = 0.043 
𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑠𝑢𝑔𝑎𝑟 = 69000 
 
Crop production revenue cereals 
For cereals, we take into account the production of winter barley, spring barley, rye, oats, spring 
wheat and winter wheat, as well as triticale and a group of ‘other cereals’. We treat these types of 
cereals as equal in the model under the name ‘cereals’. For computing the average yield of cereals 
from a crop, we use the average yield of winter wheat in reference year 2010 as a starting point 
(see (CBS & LEI, 2011). The same type of treatment is used to conduct the crop price for cereals 
(0.1135 euro/kg)(CBS & LEI, 2011). The following function is used in the model. 
 
𝑃𝑌𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙 = (𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑗 ∙ 𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙 ∙ 𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙) ∙ 𝑝𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙 (9) 
𝑝𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙 = 0.1135 
𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙 = 8849 
 
Nitrogen balance on parcel level: Manure supply revenue and fertilizer costs 
For each crop grown on a iparcel  a fixed amount of nitrogen/ha is assumed to be used. According 
to the Dutch legal manure regulations, the legal norm for nitrogen stemming from animal manure is 
170 kg/ha. For individual crops and soil qualities, Dutch authorities have declared special norms. 
These norms are given in Table I-2. 
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Table I- 2: Legal norms manure disposal (source: (EL&I, 2010), Agricultural Census data 2010)  
Crop Maximum N kg/ha 
stemming from manure 
on sandy soil 
Maximum N kg/ha 
stemming from manure on 
sea-clay soil 
Average use of 
fertilizer in kg N/ha  
Starch potatoes 240 230 45 
Sugar beets 145 150 90 
Cereals 245* 160* 60 
*Using winter wheat as reference 
 
Arable farmers earn revenue from applying animal manure on their parcels. We assume that all 
farmers apply the maximum legal norm (according to (EL&I, 2010) on their parcels, given the soil 
type (either sea-clay or sand). The manure application revenue for farmers is equal to the legal 
manure application norms, depending on the soil type times the average price for manure disposal.  
 
𝑀𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑗 = 𝑀𝐴𝑗 ∙ 𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒 (10) 
𝑀𝐴𝑗 = 𝑓(𝑀𝐴𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ,𝑀𝐴𝑠𝑢𝑔𝑎𝑟 ,𝑀𝐴𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙) (11) 
 
The average price that arable farmers receive for manure application depends on the type of 
manure, which could stem from pigs, poultry or cows. We assume an average manure disposal price 
which we base on the average price paid for manure disposal in 2010 (CBS, 2010) which is 14 
euro/ton, with 4.4 kg N/ton, gives an average manure disposal price per kg N of 0.06 euro/kg N. 
(source: (Verloop, Hilhorst, Teenstra, & Meerkerk, 2009). In practice, a distinction can be made 
between different types of animal manure, stemming from cows, poultry or pigs. For this project we 
take the average disposal price, as is used in the ‘Koeien en Kansen’ LEI-ASG project by (Verloop et 
al., 2009). 
𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒 = 0.06 
 
The price of fertilizer per kg N is 0.80 euro/kg N (reference pure nitrogen calcium ammonium nitrate 
27% KAS stemming from (Verloop et al., 2009))  
 
𝑝𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑟 = 0.80 
𝐹𝐶𝑖𝑗 = 𝐹𝑈𝑗 ∙ 𝑝𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑟 ∙ 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑗 (12) 
𝐹𝑈𝑗 = 𝑓(𝐹𝑈𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ ,𝐹𝑈𝑠𝑢𝑔𝑎𝑟 ,𝐹𝑈𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙) (13) 
𝐹𝑈𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ = 45 
𝐹𝑈𝑠𝑢𝑔𝑎𝑟 = 90 
𝐹𝑈𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙 = 60 
 
Cultivation costs 
We assume a fixed cultivation costs per hectare thereby taking into account costs for sowing, 
harvesting etc. The average cultivation costs per hectare can be distinguished for the three different 
crops. Furthermore, the function includes a part which is depending on the average production in kg 
per crop, assuming that for example starch potatoes asks for higher cultivation costs because of 
more costs for weed control.  
 
𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑗 = 𝑓(𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ ,𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑢𝑔𝑎𝑟 ,𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙 , 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑗)  (14) 
𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ = 1406 ∙ 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑗 (15) 
𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑢𝑔𝑎𝑟 = 1014 ∙ 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑗 (16) 
𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙 = 725 ∙ 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑗 (17) 
 
Source: (Van Reeuwijk et al., 2010) 
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Transport costs 
Transport costs ( iTRC ) depend on the distance from the parcel to the farmstead ( ikm ) and 
depends on the type of crop. As sugar beets have the highest kg/ha production, we assume that 
more effort is needed to transport the harvest to the farmstead. For each parcel the distance to the 
farmstead is known. A fixed average per kilometer is used, to represent the costs of machinery and 
transport to the parcels.  
 
𝑇𝑅𝐶𝑖𝑗 = 𝑓(𝑇𝑅𝐶𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ ,𝑇𝑅𝐶𝑠𝑢𝑔𝑎𝑟 ,𝑇𝑅𝐶𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙 , 𝑘𝑚𝑖) (18) 
𝑇𝑅𝐶𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ = 40 ∙ 𝑘𝑚𝑖 (19) 
𝑇𝑅𝐶𝑠𝑢𝑔𝑎𝑟 = 60 ∙ 𝑘𝑚𝑖 (20) 
𝑇𝑅𝐶𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙 = 20 ∙ 𝑘𝑚𝑖 (21) 
 
Farmers’ choice: Contracting agri- environmental schemes 
For arable farm agents in Oost-Groningen, we focus on one type of contract aiming at the 
conservation of field edges for breeding and wintering farmland birds. We take the nature 
management plan as a reference point: farmers are able to contract field edges on the assigned 
parcels. The following restrictions are present, given the agri-environment scheme. For Oost-
Groningen we assume that field margins with a minimum with of 9 meters are contracted. We 
furthermore assume that when field margins are contracted, they apply to the entire contour of the 
parcel. We compute the surface that is covered with field margins for each parcel individually. 
Contracted field margins lead to a decrease in production yields, and lower possibilities for manure 
application. Payment per hectare for sandy soil is 1745 euro/ha; for clay soil 2028 euro/ha. 
 
𝑆𝑖
𝑠𝑎𝑛𝑑 = 1745 ∙ 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑗  (22) 
𝑆𝑖
𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑦 = 2028 ∙ 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑗 (23) 
 
With respect to cultivation costs, we assume that they are 20% higher when comparing to 
conventional farming. Lower costs because of smaller sizes of the parcel due to field margin 
management are discounted in this value. Cultivation costs still depend on the type of crop, but are 
now raised with 20% because of conservation of the field margin, sowing botanic mixes on the field 
margins etc. 
 
𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑗
𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 = 𝑓(𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 ,𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑢𝑔𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒,𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒) (24) 
𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ
𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 = 1687 ∙ 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 (25) 
𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑢𝑔𝑎𝑟
𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 = 1217 ∙ 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒  (26) 
𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙
𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 = 870 ∙ 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒  (27) 
 
Transport costs (𝑇𝑅𝐶𝑖𝑗
𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒) depend on the distance from the parcel to the farmstead ( ikm ). For 
each parcel the distance to the farmstead is known. Depending on the type of crop grown on the 
parcel, the transport costs are determined. A fixed average per kilometer is used, to represent the 
costs of machinery and transport to the parcel. For parcels with agri-environment schemes, we 
assume a percentage discount because smaller yields result in lower transportation. This percentage 
is set at 60% of the original transportation parameter values.  
 
𝑇𝑅𝐶𝑖𝑗
𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 = 𝑓(𝑇𝑅𝐶𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 ,𝑇𝑅𝐶𝑠𝑢𝑔𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 ,𝑇𝑅𝐶𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒) (28) 
𝑇𝑅𝐶𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ
𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 = 40 ∙ 𝑘𝑚𝑖 ∙ 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 (29) 
𝑇𝑅𝐶𝑠𝑢𝑔𝑎𝑟
𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 = 60 ∙ 𝑘𝑚𝑖 ∙ 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 (30) 
𝑇𝑅𝐶𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙
𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 = 20 ∙ 𝑘𝑚𝑖 ∙ 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 (31) 
𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 = 0.6 
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Appendix II: Detailed description behavioural rules dairy farm 
agent 
This Appendix describes the dairy farm agent’s behavior and the dairy farm agent’s actions. For this 
study 201 specialized dairy farms were selected from Agricultural Census data (reference year 
2010). Together, these farms use approximately 60% of all agricultural land present in the area. 
Dairy farm agents can produce milk, grass, maize or farmland biodiversity. They can also engage in 
land rental activities. Like in Oost-Groningen, they also are assumed to act autonomously and to 
attain the highest possible operational farm profit. The decision making of the modeled farms is 
highly simplified compared to that of real farmers in Winterswijk, and only serves the purpose of this 
study. 
 
Same as for the arable farm agents, dairy farm agents’ objective is to attain the highest possible 
operational farm profit, given the information the dairy farm agent has. Although no explicit linear 
optimization problem is used in SERA because of heterogeneous parcels used, the farm agents’ 
objective function can be expressed in the following way: Operational dairy farm profit is based on 
the sum of the contribution of each individual parcel (𝑖) and crops grown (𝑗) (either grass or maize) on 
land controlled by the farm agent, based on the following function (1): 
∑
=
=
n
i
ij
dairy
farm YY
1  (1)
 
 
For each parcel the profit ( ijY ) is calculated based on the following function  
),,,,,,,,( / fertilizerdisposeymanureappljmilkiiiiiiij ppppFBFCMARTRCSDIY  (2) 
With 
iiiiiiij FBFCTRCMARSDIY −−−++=  (3) 
 
s.t.  
 
Table II-1 gives an overview of the main parameters in the dairy farm model 
 
Table II- 1: Main model parameters dairy farm agent 
Description Unit of Analysis Parameter 
Dairy income on parcel i Kg/parcel 𝐷𝐼𝑖 
Fertilizer costs on parcel i Euro/ kg N 𝐹𝐶𝑖 
Manure application revenue (or costs) for parcel i Euro/kg N 𝑀𝐴𝑅𝑖 
Legal nitrogen application norm N kg/ha 𝑁𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙 
Nitrogen supply according to legal norms N kg/ha 𝑁𝑆𝑖𝑗 
Nitrogen supply realized N kg/ha 𝑁𝑆𝑖𝑗
𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙 
Nitrogen deposition due to grazing N kg/ha 𝐷𝑖 
Nitrogen leaching N kg/ha 𝐿𝑖𝑗 
Transport costs depending on parcel i Euro/ha 𝑇𝑅𝐶𝑖 
Transport costs for SNL parcel Euro/ha 𝑇𝑅𝐶𝑖
𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 
Milk production per cow Kg/cow 𝑞𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑘 
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Description Unit of Analysis Parameter 
Nitrogen production per cow N kg/cow 𝑁𝑃 
Nitrogen production per parcel i N kg/parcel 𝑁𝑃𝑖𝑗 
Fertilizer application for two crops (grass or maize) j N kg/ha 𝐹𝑈𝑗 
Mineralisation grassland  N kg/ha 𝑀𝑖 
Yield losses for the parcel i % point 𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖 
Milkprice  Euro/kg 𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑘 
Workability coefficient grassland % 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑠𝑠 
Leaching coefficient grassland % 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑠𝑠 
NEL (feed) requirements per dairy cow NEL/cow 𝑁𝐸𝐿 
SNL subsidy for parcel i Euro/ha 𝑆𝑖  
SNL contract length  year 6 
Nitrogen availability for parcel i with crop j  N kg/ha 𝑁𝐴𝑖𝑗 
Nitrogen uptake for parcel i with crop j N kg/ha 𝑁𝑈𝑖𝑗 
Dry matter production grassland DM/ha 𝐷𝑀𝑖𝑗 
Nett energy for lactation NEL kJ/kg 𝑁𝐸𝐿 
Dry matter production per parcel i, expressed in NEL NEL kJ/year 𝐷𝑀𝑁𝐸𝐿𝑖𝑗 
Feed requirements grazing cows on parcel i NEL kJ/kg 𝑇𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑗 
Fertilizer costs on parcel i with crop j Euro/ kg N 𝐹𝐶𝑖𝑗 
Fertilizer price Euro/kg N 𝑝𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑡 
Total feed bought/sold NEL kJ 𝑇𝐹𝐵𝑖𝑗 
Feed production crop j (maize) NEL 𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑗 
Fertilizer application crop j (maize) N kg/ha 𝐹𝐴𝑗 
Maximum number of cows per hectare Cows/ha 𝑟𝑐𝑜𝑤 
Expectation price for greening permit Euro/permit 𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡  
Reserve price for greening permit Euro/permit 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡  
 
 
Parcels revenue from dairy production activities 
The parcels income from dairy production ( iDI ) is calculated as the sum of number of cows per 
hectare, known as the cow-ratio ( cowr ), which is set at the initial level, times the size of the parcel in 
hectares ( ijparcel ), times the average milk production per cow ( qmilk ) which is set at 7875 
liter/cow/year (see (CBS & LEI, 2011)), times the milk price ( milkp ). The milk price is given in the 
model at a rate of 0.31 euro/liter milk. In the model is a possibility to fluctuate this level.  
 
∑ ⋅⋅⋅= )( milkijcowi pqmilkparcelrDI  (4) 
 
Nitrogen production  
The nitrogen produced by dairy cows on the parcel ( ijNP )  is calculated as the sum of nitrogen 
production per cow ( NP ) (115 kg N/cow/year, see (CBS & LEI, 2011)) times the cow-ratio ( cowr ), 
times the size of the parcel in hectares ( ijparcel ). 
ijcowij parcelrNPNP ⋅⋅= ∑  (5) 
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At the farmlevel a nitrogen availability for grassland is calculated, where the nitrogen application of 
maize is subtracted. In this way a nitrogen balance is created at farm level. Fertilizer use is assumed 
to be only on grassland which is not subject to agri-environmental schemes. Several studies, such as 
(Aarts, 1995, 1996, 2000) on nitrogen application and feed requirements in ”De Marke” show that 
the average use of fertilizer, F , in the Winterswijk region can be set at 35 kg N/ha . A future model 
extension could be the estimation of a function for fertilizer use, related to the size of the farm, the 
number of dairy cows, using FADN data.  
 
The relation between N-application and NEL production per ha per year is adapted from {Middelkoop, 
1991 #42}; {van de Ven, 1992 #47}; {Groeneveld, 1998 #38}; {Groeneveld, 2001 #39}; and 
Peerlings & Polman (2008) and  the following nitrogen supply, leach, nitrogen availability, uptake and 
dry matter yield per parcel were calculated. The legal limits of the Ministry of EL&I prescribe that 
nitrogen can be applied to the parcel up to a maximum of 250 kg N/ha ( legalN ) for manure from 
livestock. Here derogation applies; farm agents are allowed to apply 250 kg N/ha on their parcels 
when >70% of their farm is grassland.  When this changes, the legal norm is decreased to 170 kg 
N/ha10. The nitrogen supply ( ijNS ) which has to fulfill the legal norms is calculated as legal 
supply=manure. Only transportable manure is assumed to be produced by the livestock. 
 
But, the amount of N available for the grass is higher, 
real
ijNS  due to mineralization and deposition. 
The nitrogen supply (
real
ijNS ) is calculated as supply=manure+fertilizer+deposition+mineralisation. 
We assume mineralization (𝑀𝑖; process in which N is released from organic matter and becomes 
available for uptake by plants) is 250 kg N/ha, we assume deposition (𝐷𝑖; N deposited by cattle 
during grazing) is 50 kg N/ha. A workability coefficient of 100% is assumed for the use of fertilizer 
jFU , which is now set at 35.  
 
The nitrogen supply ( )
ip
NS  which is used for the legal limits norm, set by the Ministry is: 
 
legalijijij NNPparcelNS ≤⋅=  (6) 
 
The nitrogen supply which is used to calculate the availability for grass later on (
real
ijNS ), is 
calculated as  
ijiijij
real
ij NPDMFUparcelNS +++= )(  (7) 
 
Not all supplied N will be available for grass because of N leaching ( ijL ). The fraction of nitrogen 
supply that is leached is calculated using the following function: 
 
)300(32.015 −+= realijij NSL  (8) 
 
Available N ( ijNA ) at the parcel level can then be derived as follows: 
ij
real
ijij LNSNA −=  (9) 
                                                   
10 See further explanation on derogation at 
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CONSLEG:2005D0880:20100206:EN:PDF 
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Only part of the N from available N is taken up by the sward. Uptake N/ha ( ijNU ) is calculated as 
 
a
ijcaijbijb
ij
NANANA
NU
α
αααα
2
)4)(()(( 5.02
−
−+++−
=
 (10)
 
 
Where aα  is a constant (1.14), bα is the ratio cb αα / ).( cα⋅= 1761 , cα is the horizontal 
asymptote that is 11.85 per cent above the maximum N uptake per parcel.  
 
Feed production 
The dry matter yield of grass per parcel is expressed in tons of DM. The DM production depends on 
the N uptake of grass: 
 
a
ijcaijbijb
ij
NUNUNU
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β
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2
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=
 (11)
 
 
Where dm is DM yield per parcel, aβ  is a constant (19.88), bβ  is 21.6 x cβ , cβ is 1.078 x 
maximum DM production. Maximum DM production is derived from the questionnaire by (Peerlings & 
Polman, 2008) and is based on the subjective judgments of individual farmers. 
 
The nett energy for lactation ( NEL ) is the energy value of forage expressed in NEL kJ/kg DM is 
based on grazing, according to  
 
2
210 )( ijij NUNUNEL γγγ ++=  (12) 
 
Where 0γ  is 5947.932, 1γ is 15.0628 and 2γ is -0.020439 (based on (Peerlings & Polman, 2008)).  
 
δ
ij
ij
DMNEL
DMNEL
⋅
=
 (13)
 
 
The DM ( ijDMNEL ) produced per parcel, expressed in NEL kJ, per year is calculated by multiplying 
the NEL in kJ per kg DM by DM production per parcel divided by a production coefficient (δ =6.9). 
This coefficient is set at DM production to be medium quality grassland, given the questionnaire of 
Peerlings and Polman (2008).  
 
Feed requirements grazing dairy cows 
To calculate the feed requirements of the grazing dairy cows on the parcel the total net energy 
requirements for lactation ( ijTFR ) of the herd should be calculated.  
 
cowcowij rTFTFR ⋅=  (14) 
 
It is written as the NEL requirements per dairy cow ( cowTF ) times the cow-ratio ( cowr ) (see 
statement below). 
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The NEL requirements per dairy cow are calculated following the guidelines by the Dutch Ministry of 
EL&I (see (Tamminga et al., 2004)). The energy requirements of calves and heifers is not taken into 
account in this model. This can be a valuable model extension.  
 
yearcowkJNELNELNELNELTF premiumenancemamilkprodcow //8.6374)(02.1 int =++⋅=  (15) 
yearcowkJNEL
yearcowkJNEL
yearcowkJNEL
premium
enancema
milkprod
//
//.
//.
int
602
241900
563747
=
=
=
 (16) - (18)
 
 
Given the NEL requirements and the feed production for grassland, the amount of feed bought can 
be calculated as follows 
 
Feed costs 
It is assumed that the costs for buying feed are higher than for selling feed. We assume a 10% 
variation around the feed price of 0.19 euro/NEL. The feedshortage/surplus on parcel level (𝑇𝐹𝐵𝑖𝑗 ) 
is calculated using the following equation:  
 
ijijij DMNELTFRTFB −=  (19) 
 
The total feed bought can be calculated as the total feed required by the dairy cattle ( ijTFR ) minus 
the yield of energy production value from grass ( ijDMNEL ).  
 
Manure disposal costs 
When the nitrogen production (from dairy cows grazing on the parcel) exceeds the legal limits of 250 
kg N/ha the farmer needs to dispose of the manure from the parcel. Costs are involved to do so. 
Average cost of manure disposal is taken as 2 euro/kg N based on (CBS/LEI, 2007) and is 
calculated from the manure disposal cost or manure application revenue per m3 manure (Middelkoop, 
2007).  
 
when 250>ijNP  
 
The nitrogen surplus (𝑀𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑗) is a cost when the total nitrogen production ( ijNP ) exceeds the legal 
limits of 250 kg N/ha. When there is a shortage, the farmer is assumed to apply nitrogen on the 
parcel until a maximum of 250kg. 
 
When 260<ijNP  then 0<ijMAR  
 
Fertil izer costs 
On grassland a fixed amount of 35 kg N/ha is assumed to be used. Later on, the fertilizer use will be 
calculated as depending on size of the parcel and number of dairy cows within a regression analysis 
using FADN-data. For now, we stick to the 35 kg N/ha.  
 
grassfertij parcelpFC ⋅⋅= 35  (20) 
 
72 WOt-werkdocument 323 
This results in fertilizer costs ( ijFC ) which are calculated by the price of fertilizer, which is set at 
0.70 euro/ kg N ( fertp ) (source:(CBS/LEI, 2007) times 35, times the hectares of grassland (
ijparcel ).  
 
Transport costs 
Total transport costs ( iTRC )depend on the distance from the parcel to the farmstead (𝑘𝑚𝑖). For 
each parcel this distance is known. A fixed average of 50=fixedTRC euro costs per kilometer is 
used, to represent the costs of machinery, manure and cattle transport to the parcels. Furthermore, 
a constant ( const ) is used to represent the costs of mowing and other machinery on the parcel, 
multiplied by the size of the parcel. This constant is now set at 50 euro.  
 
ijifixedi parcelconstkmTRCTRC ⋅+⋅=  (21) 
 
Maizeland parcels 
Maizeland is included in the model but is not taken into account for the agri-environmental schemes 
which a farmer could choose. It is assumed that grassland parcels cannot be switched into 
maizeland parcels and vice versa for reasons of simplicity. Maizeland is used for the production of 
fodder for the dairy cattle in the model. In the model, two types of revenue can be distinguished for 
the maizeland parcels: manure disposal revenue (150 kg N/ha) and feed revenue (14973 NEL 
kJ/ha).  
 
Manure disposal revenue 
On maizeland parcels, no nitrogen is produced as grazing is not allowed. The fixed maximum manure 
application for maizeland is set by the Ministry of Agriculture at 150 kg N/ha. Average revenue from 
manure application is set at 2 euro/kg N based on (CBS/LEI, 2007) and is calculated from the 
manure disposal costs per m3 (Middelkoop, 2007). When the farmer has a negative nitrogen 
balance, the farmer is able to attract external manure on the farm and a revenue could be gained. 
Transportcosts are calculated in the same way as done for grassland parcels.  
 
Agri- environment schemes 
Farmers receive a subsidy of 1065 euro per hectare for plant species protection contracts  
 
1065
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=
⋅=
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Transport costs 
Transportation cost for parcels with AESs is assumed to be lower than for conventionally managed 
parcels. A fixed average of naturefixedTRC =20 euro costs per kilometer is used. This is lower than the 
transport costs for conventional farming, because it is assumed that less transport for i.e. manure 
disposal is needed. The transport costs ( natureijTRC )depend on the distance from the parcel to the 
farmstead ( ikm ) and the constant parameter ( const ) which is equal to the constant used in the 
conventional grassland functions.  
 
iji
nature
fixed
nature
ij parcelconstkmTRCTRC ⋅+⋅=  (23) 
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Appendix III: Explanation of the land market mechanism 
This Appendix informs about the land market mechanism used in SERA. Agents in SERA interact 
indirectly by competing on a land market which is facilitated by an Auctioneer. Agents in SERA 
interact indirectly by competing on a land market. The land market is the central interaction 
institution between agents in SERA and is fully endogenous in the model. There is a broad range of 
applications of land market mechanisms within agent-based models available for social sciences (see 
Parker et al., 2003; Parker & Filatova, 2008; Filatova et al., 2011; Kellermann et al., 2008; 
Magliocca et al., 2011). Our approach has in common with other approaches that land allocation is 
modeled through an auction mechanism in which competition for land is based on a defined bidding 
process and a set of rules for price determination and ‘matching’ of asks and bids. However, it 
differs from existing approaches in that farm agents are informed in advance when multiple parcels 
are offered simultaneously. They are informed on several attributes of the parcel: soil quality, size, 
current land use and distance to the homestead. In SERA, farm agents extend their hectare base 
exclusively so called perpetual lease contracts. This implies that the farm agent is free to offer the 
parcel again to the land market or remain farming after each simulation period. When SERA is run, 
available perpetual lease parcels stem from two sources: one is that farms offer their land to the 
market due to high opportunity costs, the second one is retirement of farmers when they reach the 
age of 65 and do not have a successor.  
 
Figure III-1 presents the sequence of events in the informed single auction market mechanism of 
SERA. At the start of each auction, the auctioneer informs the traders that the auction is open. Based 
on the outcome of the farm agent decision making (does the agent wants to offer or attract 
parcels?), traders can respond by expressing interest in the auction. Next, the auctioneer requests all 
interested agents to provide the parcels they would like to offer with a related reserve price for these 
parcels. This reserve price is determined by the valuation strategy the agent is applying. Once all 
asks have been identified, the auctioneer requests the interested agents to provide bids for the 
parcels on offer. An interested farm agent evaluates all available parcels and is allowed to create one 
bid, for the asks that he or she values the most. Again, this is decided by the farm agent’s decision 
making strategy.  
 
After all bids have been collected, the informed single auction mechanism matches bids and asks 
based on creation of the largest surplus (difference between bid price and reserve price). The 
auctioneer will inform the traders involved in a transaction, who then complete the transaction and 
are asked to provide new asks, or can update or retract their asks in the auction, based on their 
valuation and decision making rules. If there are still unaccepted asks left after the matching 
process, a new cycle of iteration of the auction is started, in which remaining participating agents are 
again asked to provide a bid for one of the remaining asks. The process continues until there are no 
asks left, or no more bids are made. The auctioneer will then inform all interested traders that the 
auction is closed. In order to calculate the transaction prices for all matched bids in the auction, the 
auctioneer uses a pricing policy in which the surplus is equally shared (k=0.5).  
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Loop [all interested traders]
Loop [all matched bidOrAsk]
Loop [all traders]
Loop [all interested traders]
Auction
informAuctionOpen
expressInterest()
Auctioneer
startAuction()
requestAsks()
requestAsks
Asks
allAsks
requestBids(allAsks)
Loop [allAsks > 0 && traded]
Loop [all interested traders]
Trader
requestBid(allAsks)
Bid
allBidsPerAsk
matchedBidsAndAsks
informAccepted(bidOrAsk)
informAuctionClosed()
Determine
WiningBids
 
Figure III- 1: Sequence diagram 
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Appendix IV: Exchanging green permits 
During the WOT N&M stakeholder workshop on 17 September 2012, stakeholders from the two case 
study areas found the results counterintuitive. They agreed on the fact that when exchange of 
greening permits is allowed, these greening permits would be applied to parcels with low 
productivity. However, they assumed that these parcels would cluster together, resulting in higher 
number of ecopoints for scenario 2 (collective implementation of 7% EFAs). Therefore, we further 
explain the results by giving an example on how the number of ecopoints differs when comparing 
both scenarios, given the assumptions made in the model. For simplicity reasons, we use the set-up 
of Figure 3.2, used to explain the spatial cohesion Reilly-index, as a starting point.   
 
Figure IV-1 illustrates a hypothetical situation with four farms in the area, all having to take 7% of their 
agricultural land out of production. We assume that all farm agents have a farm size of 100 hectares. 
This means that they take 7 hectares out of production for ecological purposes. We assume that the 
7% EFA measure is applied on complete parcels, meaning that they are indivisible. The four farms 
take four parcels (parcel A, B, C and D) out of production: parcel A is owned by farm agent 1, parcel 
B by farm agent 2, parcel C by farm agent 3 and parcel D by farm agent 4. 
 
 
Figure IV- 1: Example of calculation of the spatial cohesion Reilly-index for scenario 1 (current EC 
proposal), given four farm agents that comply to the 7% EFAs measure by taking out of production 7% of 
their own agricultural land. 
 
Table IV-1 illustrates the calculation of the spatial cohesion Reilly-index for the two parcels A and B, 
that are both taken out of production to comply to the 7% EFAs measure. Parcel A and B both have a 
size of 7 hectares, and are situated in the proximity of four different nature areas (NCAs), and two 
other parcels that are taken out of production to oblige to the 7% EFAs measure (parcel C owned by 
farm agent 3 and parcel D owned by farm agent 4).  
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Table IV- 1: Spatial cohesion Reilly-index for two parcels (A and B) in scenario 1 (current EC proposal) 
given surrounding four nature areas and two other parcels that are taken out of production for the 7% 
EFAs measure 
NCA or 
other 
AES site 
NCA size 
(m2) 
Size 
parcel A 
(m2) 
Distance 
to parcel 
A (m) 
Size / 
(Distance
)2 
Size of 
parcel B 
(m2) 
Distance 
to parcel 
B (m) 
Size / 
(Distance)2 
Sum Reilly 
index 
parcel A & 
B 
1 1,000,000 70,000 1,000 1.07 70,000 1,400 0.5459  
2 500,000  2,100 0.1293  400 3.5625  
3 200,000  600 0.75  700 0.551  
4 900,000  1,200 0.6736  2,000 0.2425  
C 70,000  2,000 0.35  200 1.925  
D 70,000  400 0.875  1,800 0.0432  
Spatial 
cohesion 
Reilly-
index 
   3.848   6.8701 10.7181 
 
Table IV-1 shows that the spatial cohesion Reilly-index is larger for parcel B, as it is situated closer to 
one of the nature areas, and is situated close to one of the other parcels that is taken out of 
production to oblige to the 7% EFAs measure (parcel C). 
 
 
Figure IV- 2: Example of calculation of the spatial cohesion Reilly-index for scenario 2 (collective 
implementation of 7% EFAs), given exchange of greening permits to the size of 7 hectares from farm 
agent 3 to farm agent 4.   
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Figure IV-2 illustrates what happens in the area when farm agents are allowed to exchange greening 
permits with each other. We assume that farm agent 3 transfers greening permits with a size of 7 
hectares to farm agent 4, who will take 7 extra hectares out of production to comply to the 7% EFAs 
measure. In return, farm agent 4 receives a compensatory payment from farm agent 3. 
 
Figure IV-2 shows that farm agent 4 takes an extra 7 hectares out of production. Parcel C is not 
anymore shown in the figure, as farm agent 3 now uses this parcel for conventional agricultural 
production. Table IV-2 illustrates the calculation of the spatial cohesion Reilly-index for the two 
parcels A and B, taking into account the exchange of greening permits from farm agent 3 to farm 
agent 4.  
 
Table IV- 2: Spatial cohesion Reilly-index for two parcels (A and B) in scenario 2 (collective implementation 
7% EFAs) given exchanged greening permits and surrounding four nature areas  
NCA or 
other 
AES site 
NCA size 
(m2) 
Size 
parcel A 
(m2) 
Distance 
to parcel 
A 
(m) 
Size / 
(Distance)2 
Size of 
parcel B 
(m2) 
Distance to 
parcel B 
(m) 
Size / 
(Distance)2 
Sum Reilly 
index 
parcel A & 
B 
1 1,000,00
0 
70,000 1,000 1.07 70,000 1,400 0.5459  
2 500,000  2,100 0.1293  400 3.5625  
3 200,000  600 0.75  700 0.551  
4 900,000  1,200 0.6736  2,000 0.2425  
Da 70,000  400 0.875  1,800 0.0432  
Db 70,000  500 0.56  1,900 0.0388  
Spatial 
cohesion 
Reilly-
index 
   4.058   4.9839 9.0419 
 
Table IV-2 shows that the total number of achieved ecopoints in the region decreased from 
approximately 10.72 to 9.04. This is due to a transfer of greening permits (of 7 hectares) from farm 
agent 3 to farm agent 4, leading to a decrease in the number of ecopoints for parcel B, as the 
nearby situated parcel C changed to conventional production. The number of ecopoints for parcel A 
increased, because more 7% EFAs land is situated nearby. 
 
From this theoretical example, it is shown that when exchange of greening permits is allowed given a 
perfect market situation, the number of ecopoints decreases given the assumptions made for this 
study.  
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